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RESEARCH FRAUD: METHODS FOR DEALING WITH AN ISSUE THAT NEGATIVELY IMPACTS 
SOCIETY‘S VIEW OF SCIENCE 
 
 
Dr. Dov Greenbaum1 
 
Like the legal and medical professions, the relatively insular 
academic scientific community has always preferred to deal with instances 
of misconduct quietly, without external intervention. Recent highly 
publicized instances of scientific misconduct have shocked the 
community, renewing calls for alternative approaches to address this 
growing threat to science‘s position of trust within society, and 
consequently the public‘s generous funding of academic research. 
Science‘s inability to effectively define the outer boundaries of 
misconduct, coupled with a lack of ethics education and enforcement, has 
led to the current situation. This article examines the current level of fraud 
and enforcement and suggests some policy alternatives to the status quo.  
This article first presents a novel tiered structure based on a simple 
analysis of two basic components of any instance of scientific misconduct, 
to provide a method to discriminate between different levels of 
misconduct. Next, this article looks to a number of authorities and 
institutions that could educate current and future scientists about the nature 
and effects of fraud in scientific research. Finally, this article explores 
options for enforcing and punishing instances of misconduct, including 
both civil and criminal, particularly mindful of the devastating career 
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implications resulting from any association with an investigation of 
misconduct. In this vein, First Amendment and due process issues are 
highlighted and examined. This article concludes that, given the 
devastating repercussions to even exonerated scientists, a criminal code 
that takes into account the particular concerns of the scientific community 
would best provide protection for scientists and promote a more ethical 
scientific community. 
 





 Trust and integrity have always been central components of the basic science 
research enterprise. For centuries scientists have successfully policed themselves, 
preserving their communal values. While seventeenth century mechanisms, created and 
imposed by the emerging scientific community, used to adequately regulate the 
profession,2 the tremendous growth and expansion of science, particularly within the last 
half century,3 has made self-regulation of scientific conduct significantly more difficult 
and complex.4 Some, asserting that science has lost its moral compass, are attempting to 
create and impose artificial boundaries to prevent unethical practices, placing unhelpful 
limitations on scientific discovery. One such boundary commonly suggested, but nearly 
impossible to uphold, has been that basic researchers limit themselves to only those 
research directions that will categorically never harm humanity. 5 
                                                 
2 Henry Oldenburg, inspired by Francis Bacon‘s Novum Organum, was the pioneer behind the 
journal and behind the idea of peer review; Oldenburg would have articles sent to experts for 
review before including them in the Philosophical Transactions. A hundred years later, when the 
Royal Society took over the editorial process of the journal, the concept of peer review was 
cemented as a requirement for publication. Subsequently, the notions of wide dissemination and 
peer review have become general hallmarks of scientific journal publishing. Dov Greenbaum, 
Joanna Lim, & Mark Gerstein, An Analysis of the Present System of Scientific Publishing: What‟s 
Wrong and Where to Go from Here?, 28 Interdisc. Sci. Revs. 293, 293 (2003). For a review of 
seventeenth century scientific advancement, see, e.g., Peter Harrison, Was There a Scientific 
Revolution?, 15 Eur. Rev. 445, 445-54 (2007); Ray Spier, The History of the Peer-Review 
Process, 20 Trends Biotechnology 357, 357 (2002). 
3  
Science . . . has gone from being the province of gentlemen to being a central 
force ofsociety; from a financially marginal part of governmental outlays to a 
significant one; from a minimal part of the academic enterprise to a dominant 
one. . . .  
. . . . 
Science as it is done today, however, really dates back only to the end of 
World War II, when the U.S. government committed itself to the massive 
funding of basic scientific investigation.  
David Baltimore, Tanner Lectures on Human Values at Cambridge University: On Doing Science 
in the Modern World, (Mar. 9-10, 1992), in The Tanner Lectures on Human Values,  263-65  
(Sterling McMurrin ed., Cambridge Univ. Press, vol. 13 1992). 
4 Mildred K. Cho, Glen McGee, & David Magnus, Research Conduct: Lessons of The Stem 
Cell Scandal, 311 Sci. 614, 614-15 (2006).  
5  
[M]any scientists still cling to an ivory tower mentality founded on precepts 
such as ―science should be done for its own sake,‖ ―science is neutral,‖ and 
―science cannot be blamed for its misapplication.‖ Their logic rests on the 
distinction between pure and applied science. It is only the application of science 
that can be harmful, they allege. As for pure science, they say that the scientist's 
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 These recent debates in research ethics have pitted renowned scientists against 
each other in determining whether or not science needs to codify a set of ethical rules and 
regulations.6 Notwithstanding the reality that basic science researchers are rarely 
qualified to ever determine or evaluate the eventual ethical issues resulting from 
downstream application of their research,7 a particular apprehension of those opposing 
                                                                                                                                                 
only obligation is to make the results of research known to the public. What the 
public does with them is its business, not that of the scientist.  
Sir Joseph Rotblat, A Hippocratic Oath for Scientists, 286 Sci. 1475, 1475 (1999).  
6 See, e.g., Comm. on Sci., Eng‘g, and Pub. Policy, Nat‘l Acad. of Sci., Nat‘l Acad. of Eng‘g, 
& Inst. of Med., On Being a Scientist: Responsible Conduct in Research 20 (2d. ed. 1995) 
[hereinafter COSEPUP Report] (―Even scientists conducting the most fundamental research need 
to be aware that their work can ultimately have a great impact on society.‖); Marie Cassidy, 
Introduction: Forum on Responsible Conduct in Biomedical Research, 224 Proc. Soc‘y for 
Experimental Biology & Med. 203, 204 (2000) (―Compared with 50 or 100 years  ago, the pursuit 
of science as a career has evolved into a cooperative,  collaborative undertaking, increasingly 
interdisciplinary in its execution. Accordingly, there is an urgent need to enunciate and integrate 
code concepts into the warp and woof of the research cultural fabric.‖); Sir Joseph Rotblat, 
Remember Your Humanity, Nobel Prize Acceptance Speech (Dec. 10, 1995) (advocating that 
scientists should stop assisting in the creation of nuclear weapons).  
 
A common and disturbing feature of the ubiquitous bioethical commentaries 
is the short shrift—often, complete inattention—given to the feasibility of the 
technologies under discussion. So many of the commentaries include the caveat 
―when the technology is good enough‖ and then carry on with the ethical 
analyses and risk-benefit assessments. Yet, many of the futurist therapies and 
fixes are never going to become standard or useful, because the technologies are 
not now and never will be precise, predictable, and reliably controllable.  
Ruth Levy Guyer & Jonathan D. Moreno, Slouching Toward Policy: Lazy Bioethics and the 
Perils of Science Fiction, 4 Am. J. of Bioethics W14 (2004) (advocating scientists ought to limit 
their imagination); see also Irving Lerch, To Pledge or Not to Pledge: An Oath for Scientists?, 
APS News, Mar. 2001, at 8 (warning of the dangers of oaths).  
7 This argument against imposing ethical guidelines is not without merit. See, e.g., Yandell 
Henderson, Patents Are Ethical, 77 Sci. 324, 325 (1933) (―Any new practice rule or regulation 
that . . . in any way impairs scholarly freedom, will tend rather to diminish than to insure the 
maintenance of scholarly ethics and faculty morale. Regulations impair ethics.‖). Similar 
arguments have been made to support the current expansive scope of patentability within the US 
patent system. See generally Philip Grubb, Patents for Chemicals, Pharmaceutical & 
Biotechnology (4th ed. 2004). In contrast to the European patent system, the United States patent 
regime creates a sharp distinction between patenting technology, and the corresponding ethical 
and moral questions associated with that technology—the so-called ―patent first, ask questions 
later‖ concept. Margo A. Bagley, Patent First, Ask Questions Later: Morality and Biotechnology 
in Patent Law, 45 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 469, 469-70 (2003); see also Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange 
Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (differentiating between morality and utility). 
But see Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property in Higher Life Forms: The Patent System and 
Controversial Technologies, 47 Md. L. Rev. 1051, 1075 (1987-88) (stating that new technologies 
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such an institution is the concern that the opportunity costs will be much greater than the 
perceived benefits.8 
 Part of what has driven the debate on ethics and morals in science has been a 
perceived decline in the public‘s perception of scientists and their research,9 and a 
concomitant decline in support for increased science funding. 10 Those in favor of a ―do 
                                                                                                                                                 
should be patentable, but that the patent office should reserve ―the right to regulate specific 
applications. This is the only sensible course.‖). Scholars in favor of this US Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) position argue that the lost opportunities associated with complex 
ethical bottlenecks at the beginning of the innovation pipeline are too great to support broad 
limitations. See, e.g., Shirley Tilghman & David Baltimore, Therapeutic Cloning is Good for 
America , Wall St. J., Feb. 26, 2003, at A16 (invoking the calling for of bans on recombinant 
DNA technology in the late seventies, Baltimore and Tilghman argue, ―A broad ban [on 
therapeutic cloning] would stifle innovation in a key area of biomedical research. . . . We need 
safeguards, not a ban‖). Ethical issues are better dealt with by either trained professionals, or 
elected officials, not by underpaid and overworked examiners at the patent office. See, e.g., James 
R. Chiapetta, Comment, Of Mice and Machine: A Paradigmatic Challenge to Interpretation of 
the Patent Statute, 20 Wm. Mitchell L. Rev. 155, 178 (1994) (―The proper venue for 
consideration of moral issues of biotechnology is within the regulatory agency entrusted with the 
product's oversight, not the PTO.‖). 
8 Throughout this Article I would like to distinguish between clinical research that may require 
more ethical and moral oversight, and basic science research that may be multiple steps away 
from even a potential practical technology. This Article deals mainly in issues surrounding bas ic 
science research. 
9 See, e.g., Sven Widmalm & Jörgen Nissen, Final Report of the Project: Science and 
Technology Studies at Uppsala 6 (2004). (―[P]aradox of contemporary science and technology: 
faith in science and technology as engines of progress has perhaps never been stronger, but at the 
same time public trust in scientific and technological expertise seems unstable.‖).  
10 See, e.g., Select Committee on Science and Technology, Science and Society: Third Report, 
1999-2000, H.L. 38,  § 2.41, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldselect/ldsctech/38/3801.htm. There is no 
consensus as to what the public actually thinks of science and scientists as there are numerous 
conflicting reports, studies, surveys, and polls. For an overview of the issues, see, e.g., Wellcome 
Trust, Going Public: Public Attitudes to Science and Research, Dec. 1, 2002, 
http://www.wellcome.ac.uk/News/2002/Features/WTD004707.htm. See also Baltimore, supra 
note 3, at 298 (―Science is suffering from something of an image problem and for an enterprise so 
dependent on public support that could mean trouble ahead.‖). For a study finding generally 
positive attitudes toward science, see, e.g., Nat‘l Sci. Bd., Nat‘l Sci. Found., Science and 
Technology: Public Attitudes and Public Understanding, in Science and Engineering Indicators 
2002 (2002), available at http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind02/pdf/c07.pdf . See also the results 
of the Harris poll: ―Only two occupations are perceived to have ―very great‖ prestige by more 
than half of all adults, scientists (52%) and doctors (52%).‖ Harris Interactive, The Harris Poll 
#65, Doctors, Scientists, Firemen, Teachers and Military Officers Top List as "Most Prestigious 
Occupations,‖ Sept. 15, 2004, available at 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=494; Note also a rise in stature for 
scientists the following year: ―Four occupations are perceived to have ―very great‖ prestige by at 
least half of all adults - firemen (56%), scientists (56%), doctors (54%), and nurses (50%).‖ 
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no harm‖ provision imposed on all scientists argue that it will help revive faith in basic 
science research and the scientists who conduct it. If we remove the fear that taxpayer 
money is going towards a perceived ―Franken-science,‖ then the public will be more 
willing to continue to fund basic science research without overburdening regulation. 11 
 This article argues that there are potentially deeper and more important ethical 
issues in science that first need to be dealt with: the growing threat of fraud and 
misconduct in research.12 Faith in science must first come from the unwavering belief by 
the public that scientists can be trusted to do their job,13 whatever it entails, and whatever 
it produces, particularly when it is often being done with taxpayer money. 14 Referring to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Harris Interactive, The Harris Poll #69, Firemen, Doctors Scientists, Nurses and Teachers Top 
List as "Most Prestigious Occupations,‖ Sept. 8, 2005, available at 
http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=599.  
Much of the confusion as to where science stands in the public‘s eye may be attributable to the 
conflation of science and technology. Whereas somewhere around 80% of the public supports 
basic science research, technology is v iewed with ‗suspicion and hostility.‘ See, e.g., D. Allan 
Bromley, Sheffield Lecture at Yale University: Science, Technology, and Politics (Mar. 22, 2001) 
(“Science studies what is; technology creates what never was.‖ (quoting von Karmen)).  
11 Note also that regulation imposed by society from outside of the scientific community may 
not be able to properly promote scientific ideals as well as change from within. ―An ethical 
climate must be fostered from within the scientific community.‖  Mark Frankel, Scientific 
Societies as Sentinels of Responsible Research Conduct, 224 Proc. Soc‘y for Experimental 
Biology & Med. 216, 216 (2000). 
12 ―There‘s a lot to worry about.‖ Donald Kennedy, Research Fraud and Public Policy, 300 
Sci. 393, 393 (2003) (noting that hard sciences are not the only sciences that suffer from fraud, in 
fact, often social scientists have political incentives to commit fraud, something that exists to a 
lesser degree in basic science research);see also European Sci. Found., Science Policy Briefing 
10: Good Scientific Practice in Research and Scholarship 1 (Dec. 2000), available at 
http://www.esf.org/sciencepolicy/170/ESPB10.pdf (―At a time when the need to build trust 
between science and society is becoming ever more important, it is vital that the conduct of 
science itself is based on the highest ethical considerations and that misconduct within science 
itself can be identified and dealt with in an open and transparent manner.‖); Pieter J. Drenth, 
Responsible Conduct in Research, 12 Sci. Eng. Ethics 13, 13 (2006) (―Society, politics and the 
media pose critical questions tending to censorship or at least control of science.‖); Benjamin 
Sovacool, Using Criminalization and Due Process to Reduce Scientific Misconduct, 5 Am. J. of 
Bioethics W1 (2005). 
13 See R. Stephen Berry, Validity and Ethics in Science, 300 Sci. 1341, 1341 (2003) (noting it 
is important for the public to acknowledge and understand that a lack of confidence in scientists 
because of fraud in science is independent of the confidence that the public should feel towards 
the scientific process as a whole; science‘s validation methodologies serve to protect science from 
the long term effects of bad data).  
14 ―Indeed, failure to police a profession vigorously can lead to the general decline in 
reputation and public acceptance of that profession, which can also result, in the case of a 
governmentally funded profession, in a decline in monetary support.‖  Susan M. Kuzma, 
Criminal Liability for Misconduct in Scientific Research, 25 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 357, 399 
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a recent South Korean stem cell scandal, some commentators noted that ―scientists fear 
that the episode will damage not only the public perceptions of stem-cell research, but 
science‘s image as a whole.‖15 ―[E]ven a small number of instances of scientific 
misconduct is unacceptable and could threaten the continued public confidence in the 
integrity of the scientific process and in the stewardship of federal funds.‖16 
 If science is to regain and then maintain its position of trust within society, it has 
to show that it is itself trustworthy, and that it can police itself properly: 17 ―Unless the 
trust that scientists traditionally extend to each other also characterizes the relationship 
between science and the public, the research enterprise is likely to become much more 
encumbered by counterproductive regulation and oversight.‖ 18 Only once science deals 
with these more pressing issues can the scientific community begin to debate the ethical 
and moral concerns regarding significant downstream applications of research. 19 
 Not that the scientific community has not made some efforts to show an interest, 
albeit limited, in dealing with the issue of fraud – every couple of years the issue of fraud 
and misconduct is momentarily revived, and then just as quickly there is a lull again in 
commentary on research ethics. The scientific community‘s current inability to deal 
effectively with fraud, despite this periodic publication routine, implies that the issue is 
not something that can be solved through infrequent and isolated discussions. Rather, as 
                                                                                                                                                 
(1992). ―[T]he more corrosive force is the undermining of public confidence in an important 
public institution and the engendering of a cynical perception that the reporting and the funding 
of scientific research is a rigged game.‖ Id. at 421. 
15 Erika Check & David Cyranoski, Korean Scandal Will Have Global Fallout, 438 Nature 
1056, 1056-57 (2005).  
16 Nat‘l Inst. of Health, U.S. Dep‘t of Health and Hum. Servs., Responsibilities of Awardee 
and Applicant Institutions for Dealing With and Reporting Possible Misconduct in Science, 18 
NIH Guide For Grants and Contracts 30 at 1 (Sept. 1, 1989), available at 
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/historical/1989_09_01_Vol_18_No_30.pdf. 
17 See Frankel, supra note 11, at 216 (noting that recent scandals have at least fueled 
skepticism among the public as to science‘s ability, and importantly, willingness, to police itself).  
18 Bruce Alberts & Kenneth Shine, Scientists and the Integrity of Research, 266 Sci.1660, 
1660 (1994); see also Baltimore, supra note 3, at 273 (―The regulation of recombinant DNA 
technology was a model of responsible, effective regulation largely because it was left in the 
hands of the scientific community.‖); Daniel J. Kevles, Preface to Vannevar Bush, Science – The 
Endless Frontier: A Report to the President on a Program for Postwar Scientific Research (Nat‘l 
Sci. Found. 1990) (1945) (―Science still operates best in an environment of freedom, including 
freedom from security restrictions‖); Marcel C. LaFollette, The Politics of Research Misconduct: 
Congressional Oversight, Universities, and Science, 65 J. of Higher Educ. 261, 261 (1994) (―The 
foundation of public support for science . . . is trust . . . that scientists and research institutions are 
engaged in the dispassionate search for truth.‖ (quoting Representative John Dingell)).  
19 See, e.g,, Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Thank God for the Lawyers: Some Thoughts on the 
(Mis)Regulation of Scientific Misconduct, 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 801, 816-18 (1999). 
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incentives to commit fraud grow,20 scientists need to be constantly vigilant. This need 
will become further magnified as science becomes more intertwined with other aspects of 
society and policy, resulting in a greater need for science to become outwardly 
accountable to the public.21 
 This article explores numerous issues relating to fraud in academic basic science 
research. The next section discusses basic issues of fraud and misconduct in science. It 
attempts to define fraud and to ascertain its prevalence within the research community. 
Of particular focus will be determining whether, in dealing with fraudulent activity, the 
scientific community ought to discriminate in its response to any particular instance of 
fraud based on the nature and effect of that fraud. The section concludes with a 
discussion on whether fraud and misconduct in science ought to be a real concern for all 
scientists. 
 The following section looks to policy issues in dealing with fraud. This section is 
divided into three parts looking at who has been and who should be responsible for 
setting the standards of fraud, teaching about fraud and misconduct to scientists, and 
policing researchers and enforcing misconduct regulations. Finally, in the conclusion, the 
article offers a summarized policy recommendation for dealing with fraud and 
misconduct in science. 
 The article is particularly apropos given recent events, such as the stem cell 
scandal in South Korea, which both expose the fact that major fraud continues in science 









                                                 
20 These sorts of incentives might include increased pressure to publish to get a limited 
number of tenured positions.  See, e.g., Martina Franzen, Simone Rodder, & Peter Weingart, 
Fraud: Causes and Culprits as Perceived by Science and the Media, 8 EMBO Reports 3, 4 
(2007). According to some,  
 
The intense competition for recognition by peers and by the general public, 
for prizes, for commercial gain, is slowly eroding the scientific ethic, this is the 
ethic that depends on cooperation among scientists, on a morality that drives out 
selfishness, one's acknowledgments of and by others. And if this ethos is 
disappearing, then the citation indices no longer reflect worth but a lack of the 
scientific communities. The future of the scientific endeavor depends on 
regaining the scientific soul.  
Adil E. Shamoo & Cheryl D. Dunigan, Ethics in Research, Experimental Biology & Med. 205, 
208 (2000) (quoting Phillip Siekivitz).  
21 See, e.g,, Baltimore, supra note 3, at 301. 
Vol. X The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review  2009 
 
 69 
II. FRAUD IN SCIENCE 
 
 Fraud has always existed in some form throughout the history of science. Many 
important and relevant scientists, including Ptolemy, 22 Copernicus, Galileo,23 Newton, 24 
Dalton, Kepler,25 Mendel,26 Freud, and Pasteur,27 have been accused of, and arguably 
may have actually committed, some fraudulent research over the course of their scientific 
careers.28 Fraud has only recently been extensively and openly discussed in scientific 
circles. Notwithstanding the lack of concern amongst the general rank and file scientists, 
fraud in science seems to be becoming more prevalent. This apparent surge of fraud may 
be due to global changes within the scientific community; particularly growing 
competition for scarce research positions, limited government funding, and a desire for 
greater recognition for one‘s scientific achievements. 29 
 In the 1980s and early 1990s, the social climate ―became decidedly more 
moralistic,‖30 with politicians eagerly investigating an abundance of allegations, and the 
media publicizing those (often unfounded) allegations.31 Concomitant with these 
                                                 
22 See Georg W. Kreutzberg, The Rules of Good Science: Preventing Scientific Misconduct is 
the Responsibility of All Scientists, 5 EMBO Reports 330, 330 (2004).  
23 Keith A. Pickering, The Ancient Star Catalog: A Question of Authorship, Presentation to 
the 4th Biennial History of Astronomy Workshop at Notre Dame University (July 3, 1999) 
(transcript available at http://www.nd.edu/~histast4/exhibits/papers/Pickering/index.htm); see 
also Kreutzberg, supra note 22, at 330. 
24 See, e.g., Kreutzberg, supra note 22, at 330. 
25 William J. Broad, After 400 Years, a Challenge to Kepler: He Fabricated His Data, Scholar 
Says, N.Y. Times, Jan. 23, 1990, at C1. 
26 See, e.g., David Goodstein, What Do We Mean When We Use the Term `Science Fraud'?, 
Scientist, Mar. 2, 1992, at 11. 
27 See generally William Broad & Nicholas Wade, Betrayers of the Truth (1983); Horace 
Freeland Judson, The Great Betrayal: Fraud in Science (2004); Research Fraud in the Behavioral 
and Biomedical Sciences (David J. Miller & Michel Hersen eds., 1992).  
28 This underscores Dr. Berry‘s point that there is a distinction between fraud in science and 
the validity of science; given that science relies on trial and error as a major component of the 
scientific process, fraudulent data will rarely become a long-term part of the scientific canon. 
Berry, supra note 13, at 1341. 
29 See, e.g., Franzen, Rodder, & Weingart, supra note 20, at 3; see also Kreutzberg, supra note 
22, at 331 (noting that an overlooked reason for the growth in fraud is that fraud tends to beget 
more fraud; once you have gotten away from it, you do it again, each time more audaciously).  
30 Marcel C. LaFollette, The Evolution of the "Scientific Misconduct" Issue: An Historical 
Overview, 224 Proc. of the Soc. for Experimental Biology & Med. 211, 211 (2000). 
31 Id. Noting further that  
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institutional witch hunts, there was a growing public frustration with what seemed to be 
rampant fraud and abuse in government contracting. 32 The public face of science fraud 
has gone through some evolution in the media over this period. In the 1970s, the 
language used to describe science fraud emphasized the criminal aspects of fraud in 
science. Later, in the 1980s, the media‘s terminology associated with fraud began to 
soften,33 and the term misconduct – i.e., ―research misconduct,‖ ―scientific misconduct,‖ 
or ―misconduct in science‖ – came into vogue.34 In parallel, post WWII, discussions of 
solutions for the issue of fraud and misconduct in science centered on the term ―research 
ethics.‖ In the 1980s there was a definitive shift from an ethics based terminology to the 
use of language centered on integrity.35 Recent publications, though, may reflect the 
beginnings of a much harder stance on fraud, incorporating the much stronger term 
―corruption.‖36 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
[T]he increased media attention also happened to coincide with attention to 
ethical conflicts in all walks of life, from the tribulations of television evangelists 
and star athletes to the foibles of legislators. Journalistic attention to scientific 
misconduct helped to spotlight science as yet another area of concern, and it drew 
politicians like moths to a flame. 
Id. 
32 Id. 
33 See Inst. for the Study of Applied & Prof‘l Ethics at Dartmouth College, Research Ethics: A 
Reader 5 (Deni Elliott & Judy E. Stern eds., 1997). According to the Reader, in law ―fraud‖ is a 
legal term  of art and it:  
 
[R]equire[s] evidence not only of intentional deception but also of injury or 
damage to victims. Proof of fraud in common law requires documentation of 
damage incurred by victims who relied on fabricated or falsified research results. 
Because this evidentiary standard seemed poorly suited to the methods of 
scientific research, ―misconduct in science‖ has become the common term of 
reference in both institutional and regulatory policy definitions.). 
Id. at 216. 
34 Drenth, supra note 12. 
35 Id. 
36 J Marvin Herndon, Basic Cause of Current Corruption in American Science, in Against the 
Tide: A Critical Review by Scientists of How Physics and Astronomy Get Done 57, 57 (Martín 
López Corredoira & Carlos Castro Perelman eds., 2008), available at http://philsci-
archive.pitt.edu/archive/00004046/01/againsttide.pdf; Jack T. Trevors & Milton H. Saier Jr, 
Corruption and Fraud in Science, 189 Water, Air & Soil Pollution 1, 1 (2006). 
Vol. X The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review  2009 
 
 71 
 Prior minimal interest in fraud among scientists might have stemmed from the 
conventional wisdom that fraud in science is rare,37 that it is usually the act of an 
unbalanced researcher,38 that science is a supposedly self-correcting discipline,39 and that 
fraud in science is an internal, correctable matter of no relevance or interest to the public. 
These excuses, however, have lost much of their grounding and validity. And 
particularly, while paying a growing share of the cost of research, the public has become 
more interested in the specifics of government funded research and may be losing its 
patience with the scientific establishment‘s desire to continue to police itself. 
 The scientific community may have only recently come to the realization that 
scientific misconduct, as well as questionable research practices, is endemic and that 
there are serious costs associated with scientific misconduct, including disruption of 
research, wasted money and effort spent dealing with fraud, and, importantly, a growing 
public distrust of science and a defacement of the public image of science.  40  
 
 
                                                 
37 See, e.g., Kreutzberg, supra note 22, at 330 (―When scientists hear about scientific fraud, 
they quickly denounce the culprits as not being ‗true‘ scientists. The true scientist, they argue, is  
only interested in unveiling step by step the countless enigmas of nature. He or she labours [sic] 
long hours and weekends at a desk or in the laboratory to find the truth, not to invent it.‖).  
38 See, e.g,, K.J. Breen, Misconduct In Medical Research: Whose Responsibility?, 33 Internal 
Med. J. 186, 189 (2003) (noting that research misconduct has been linked to laziness, messianic 
complex, mental illness and the lack of moral capacity to distinguish right from wrong).  
39 While controversial, it is often postulated that peer review and the replication of 
experiments will discover errors and fraud in science. See Baltimore, supra note 3, at 301. But see  
Brian Vastag, Cancer Fraud Case Stuns Research Community, Prompts Reflection on Peer 
Review Process, 98 J. Nat‘l Cancer Inst. 374, 375-76 (2006).  According to Vastag,  no practical 
system could reliably detect well-concealed fraud by 
 
[A] scientist intent on covering his or her tracks.  
Peer review's strength, . . . is determining whether reported data support an 
author's assertions . . . ―evaluating the study design, to gauge whether it supports 
the interpretation being made. What it can't get at is determining whether the 
primary and raw data are true. There are so many steps in processing the raw 
data, and there are many ways an investigator or data manager could change the 
data.‖  
Vastag, supra at 375-76 (quoting Barnett S. Kramer, editor in chief of the Journal of the National 
Cancer Institute). 
40Alison Abbott, Science Comes to Terms with the Lessons of Fraud, 398 Nature 13, 13 
(1999); see also Japanese Scandals Raise Public Distrust, 398 Nature 14, 14 (1999) (noting that a 
recent white paper regarding public perceptions of Japanese science found that scientists were 
perceived as ―insular and unwilling to disclose or share details of their research due to 
preoccupation with successful results.‖ Thus, despite the ―apparently low incidence of scientific 
misconduct in Japan,‖ the Japanese are somewhat distrustful of the ir scientists.). 




A. Fraud/Misconduct Defined 
 
 Legally, fraud is defined as ―all kinds of acts which have as their objective the 
gain of an advantage to another's detriment, by deceitful or unfair means.‖41 Fraudulent 
science can be more broadly and simplistically defined as any form of research 
misconduct with the primary intent to deceive the reviewer and the reader. This broader 
definition reflects the principal problem created by fraudulent conduct: a breakdown of 
the trust that underlies the entire profession. Without trust in their peers, scientists cannot 
feasibly incorporate the multitude of research results that are presented daily in the 
literature. And, given that science is implicitly built upon the (most probably non-
replicated) results of earlier scientists,42 a breakdown of trust would lead to a breakdown 
of the entire scientific endeavor as we know it. Thus, fraud becomes all the more relevant 
in fields where reproducibility is difficult or unlikely, particularly in the biomedical 
sciences. 
 Generally, science can be divided into a four-stage research process: production, 
reporting, dissemination, and evaluation.43 There are a number of scientific social norms 
that are important for the production of reliable and certified knowledge. These norms 
include ―honesty, objectivity, tolerance, doubt of certitude, and unselfish engagement.‖ 44 
Each of these norms has the potential to break down at any of the four basic stages of 
research, resulting in some level of fraudulent science.45 
 Some have suggested that it is the breakdown of the unselfish engagement factor 
in particular that has led to the creation of a fertile environment for fraud. With the 
increased potential for pecuniary gains or professional fame, scientists may be more 
tempted than ever to commit fraud.46 Those who subscribe to this theory could 
summarize most instances of scientific fraud simply as occasions where scientists 
                                                 
41 The Law Dictionary (Anderson Publ‘g Co. 2002). 
42 Letter from Sir Isaac Newton  to Robert Hooke (Feb. 5, 1675/76) (―If I have seen further it 
is by standing upon the shoulders of giants.‖).  
43 See Daryl E. Chubin, Misconduct in Research: An Issue of Science Policy and Practice, 23 
Minerva 175, 179 (1985). 
44 Andre Cournand, The Code of the Scientist and its Relationship to Ethics, 198 Sci. 699, 700 
(1977). 
45 Chubin, supra note 43, at 176-77, outlines seven possible explanations for fraud in science: 
i) psychopathy, ii) ambition, iii) the publish or perish syndrome, iv) competition for grants, v) the 
autocratic system of the lab, vi) the limitations of peer review, and/or vii) sloppy work. With 
regard to sloppy work, see, e.g., Ward Pigman & Emmett Carmichael, An Ethical Code for 
Scientists, 111 Sci. 643, 647 (1950)  (noting that ―[f]requently  [violations of ethical guidelines] 
are the results of carelessness‖).  
46 Pigman & Carmichael, supra note 45, at 701. 
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allowed selfish considerations to override scientific norms. 47 Others acknowledge that 
many scientists are ―ambitious, self-serving, opportunistic, selfish, competitive, 
contentious, aggressive, and arrogant,‖ but claim they are nevertheless not crooks. 48 
Thus, ―it is essential,‖ they claim, ―to distinguish between research fraud on the one hand 
and irritating or careless behavioral patterns of scientists, no matter how objectionable, on 
the other. We must distinguish between the crooks and the jerks.‖49 
There are other, more specific, definitions of fraud: the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy, the National Science Foundation, and the Office of Research 
Integrity (ORI), among other agencies,50 have defined misconduct or fraud narrowly as 
―fabrication, falsification, plagiarism, or other practices . . . for proposing, co nducting, or 
reporting research.‖51 In 1995, ORI‘s Ryan Commission proposed but failed to get the 
adoption of ―a new federal definition of research misconduct and other professional 
misconduct related to research. The proposed definition specifies offenses that by 
themselves constitute research misconduct: misappropriation, interference, and 
misrepresentation (MIM).‖52 However, at present, even ORI retains the narrow 
fabrication, falsification, and plagiarism (FFP) designation. 53 The Department of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) recently published its policies regarding research 
misconduct.54 A major change includes the broadening of the definition of misconduct to 
include fraudulent activity during the peer review process. The rules also give HHS the 
discretion to respond to allegations of research misconduct when it feels the institutions 
have not done enough. The rules also replace the ad hoc appeals process, which included 
                                                 
47 See, e.g., Breeding Cheats, 445 Nature 242, 242 (2007); see also Peter Doshi, Science in the 
Private Interest: Has the Lure of Profits Corrupted Biomedical Research?, IEEE Tech. & Soc‘y 
Mag., Spring 2006, at 10 (book review). 
48 Howard K. Schachman, What is Misconduct in Science?, 261 Sci. 148, 148 (1993). 
49 Id. 
50 For example, NASA, the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of 
Energy, and the Department of Veteran‘s Affairs. 
51 Public Health Service Standards for the Protection of Research Misconduct Whistleblowers, 
65 Fed. Reg. 70,830, 70,841 (proposed Nov. 28, 2000) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 94). 
52 Comm‘n on Research Integrity, U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Hum. Servs., Integrity and 
Misconduct in Research x (1995), available at  
http://ori.dhhs.gov/documents/report_commission.pdf. 
53See,e.g., Office of Res. Integrity, U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Hum. Servs., Annual Report 2006 
2 (2007), available at http://ori.dhhs.gov/documents/annual_reports/ori_annual_report_2006.pdf 
[hereinafter ORI Annual Report]. 
54 Public Health Service Policies on Research Misconduct, 42 C.F.R. § 93 (2008) (these 
regulations substantially revised the former regulations that governed institutions that received 
PHS money). 
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a hearing in front of a three-person panel, with a more formal process that includes a 
hearing before an administrative law judge.55 
 While these and other government agencies have refined their definitions of each 
of the terms fabrication, falsification and plagiarism, or dropped the often used but vague 
―other practices clause,‖ a recent report in Nature suggests that research scientists 
perceive the definition of fraud to encompass much more than fabrication, falsification, 
or plagiarism; listing at least sixteen other forms of fraud with varying degrees of 
prevalence.56 
Thus, notwithstanding the efforts to standardize and simplify the definition of 
scientific misconduct, there remain very fuzzy lines dividing outright falsification and 
data massaging or human error and outright misconduct; in addition to the other 
ambiguous forms of science misconduct, ranging from questionable research practices,57 
                                                 
55 Id. This may be a significant worry for researchers as non-scientists may view actions taken 
by researchers in a worse light than actual scientists, although the new process may result in 
greater equity and uniformity.  
56 Brian C. Martinson, Melissa S. Anderson, & Raymond de Vries, Scientists behaving badly 
435 Nature 737, 737 (2005) (referring to these particular types of misconduct as misbehaviors); 
see also Public Health Service Policies on Research Misconduct, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,369, 28,377 
(May 17, 2005) (―Misconduct or Misconduct in Science means fabrication, falsification, 
plagiarism, or other practices that seriously deviate from those that are commonly accepted 
within the scientific community for proposing, conducting, or reporting research. It does not 
include honest error or honest differences in interpretations or judgments of data.‖) (emphasis 
added). Compare Charles Walter & Edward P. Richards, Defining Scientific Misconduct for the 
Benefit of Science, Med. & Public Health Law Site, http://biotech.law.lsu.edu/ieee/ieee23.htm 
(last visited Jan. 28, 2009) (noting the National Academy of Science suggested limiting it to just 
FFP: Fraud Fabrication and Plagiarism), with ScienceScope: NSF Stakes a Position on 
Misconduct,  276 Sci. 1779, 1779 (1997) (citing the National Science Foundation's ethics 
enforcer, Inspector-General Linda Sundro, that the ―serious deviation‖ clause in the definition of 
misconduct: ―fabrication, falsification, plagiarism (FFP), or other serious deviation from accepted 
practices,‖ is the core of the definition). The NSF is alone in this regard and many other science 
groups wanted it removed. In fact, given that many scientists found it too vague it was suggested 
that the White House interagency Committee on Fundamental Science remove it.. ScienceScope: 
NSF Stakes a Position on Misconduct, supra at 1779; see also COSEPUP Report, supra note 6, at 
18 (noting that such terminology may impede science as ―novel or unorthodox research methods‖ 
may fall under the rubric of such language, even though novel or unorthodox methods are 
sometimes necessary for science to advance).  
57 See, e.g., Charles Walter & Edward P. Richards, Research Misconduct: Catching the 
Desperados and Restraining the Zealots, 13 IEEE Eng‘g in Med. & Biology Mag. 142, 144 
(1994) (COSEPUP, the National Academies Committee on Science, Engineering, and Public 
Policy, defines questionable research practices to include ―dishonest and/or sloppy research 
practices such as sharing authorship of articles with noncontributing colleagues, accepting 
honorary authorship of articles, using facilities for private gain or keeping poor research records.‖ 
COSEPUP included a further category of misconduct: ―other misconduct, which includes sexual 
harassment, rape, embezzlement, murder, extortion, arson, theft, and violations of government 
regulations.‖); see also COSEPUP Report, supra note 6, at 17 (noting that other actions may also 
include misconduct, including: ―cover-ups of misconduct in science, reprisals against 
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conflicts of interest,58 mingling grant funds, or general sloppy publication practices. 
Unfortunately for risk-averse researchers, taking excessive precautions to ensure that they 
never step over the line can create bottlenecks in scientific research. 
 
 
B. Has the Prevalence of Fraud in Science Risen to a Problematic Level?59 
 
 The simple answer is maybe, but there is little in the way of hard empirical data 
one way or the other. Actual data showing current levels of fraudulent activity is difficult 
to collect:60 Ad hoc calculations of the frequency of serious instances of fraud (i.e., FFP 
as distinct from the types of fraud presented in Martinson et al.61) range widely from a 
relatively benign 0.001% to a more problematic 1% of all publications.62 
 The data that is available is also inconclusive: recent figures from around the 
world suggest either a very low incidence of scientific fraud or a dismal reporting record. 
In the United States, the Office of Research Integrity received 267 allegations of research 
misconduct in 2006.63 But research misconduct was found in only fifteen of the thirty 
five cases that it actually closed that year. 64 ―Most Federal agencies win most of their 
cases before hearing offices in their own agencies. In most cases, the batting average is 
                                                                                                                                                 
whistleblowers, malicious allegations of misconduct in science, and violations of due process in 
handling complaints of misconduct in science‖). 
58 Pieter J. Drenth, The Responsible Conduct of Basic and Clinical Research, Presentation at 
the Warsaw Conference (June 3-4, 2005) (stating that recent studies in JAMA and BMJ have 
shown a strong correlation between positive outcomes and industry sponsorship).  
59 How much fraud is there? ―The correct answer . . . is that nobody knows for sure how much 
fraud there really is. But, they agreed, somebody needs to find out.‖ Jeffrey Brainard, As U.S. 
Releases New Rules on Scientific Fraud, Scholars Debate How Much and Why It Occurs, Chron. 
Higher Educ., Dec. 8, 2000, at A26, available at 
http://chronicle.com/weekly/v47/i15/15a02601.htm. 
60 See, e.g., Eliot Marshall, How Prevalent Is Fraud? That's a Million-Dollar Question, 290 
Sci. 5497, 5498 (2000). But cf. Murat Cokol et al., How Many Scientific Papers Should be 
Retracted?, 8 EMBO Rep. 422, 423 (2007), available at 
http://www.nature.com/embor/journal/v8/n5/pdf/7400970.pdf. See also Ana Marušić, Author 
Misconduct: Editors as Educators of Research Integrity, 39 Med. Educ. 7, 7 (2005); Martin F. 
Shapiro & Robert P. Charrow, The Role of Data Audits in Detecting Scientific Misconduct. 
Results of the FDA Program, 261 JAMA 2505, 2505 (1989). 
61 Martinson, Anderson, & de Vries, supra note 56, at 737.  
62See, e.g., Nicholas H. Steneck, Protecting the Integrity of Science—Scientific Misconduct, 
Address at AAAS Forum on Science & Technology in Washington D.C. (Apr. 20-21, 2006). 
63 ORI Annual Report, supra note 53, at 3.  
64 Id. at 1. 
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over 70 or 80 percent.‖65 The inability to make the charges stick even in internal hearings 
may indicate an even smaller number of instances of true fraud than the number of 
claimed fraudulent activities suggests; or it may be that these cases are very hard to win. 
Of the eight cases where fraud was found in 2005, one involved plagiarism.66 In the 
United Kingdom only thirteen cases of scientific fraud have been brought before the 
Committee on Publication Ethics in the years spanning 1998 to 2003.67 In 2004, of forty-
five cases reported to the German Research Foundation, misconduct was found in only 
one instance.68 
 One possible take-home message is that detecting provable fraud is difficult. 
Without outright acknowledgement by the perpetrators, even finding fraud in individual 
publications is difficult. To find and document most instances of fraud, a peer reviewer 
would have to closely monitor all ongoing experiments, particularly if a scientist is 
meticulous in her attempts to deceive the reviewer.69 And, even when fraud is alleged, it 
is challenging, as seen from the Office of Research Integrity‘s statistics, to accurately 
prove that fraud or misconduct actually took place.70 
 One potential measure of fraud would be a value related to the number of 
retractions of printed articles. Still, a recent analysis has shown that of the (dismally low) 
395 retractions out of 9 million articles published in Medline between 1982 and 2002, 
most were retracted due to unintentional mistakes or errors, not instances of outright 
scientific misconduct.71 But, interestingly, what is most telling about the retraction data is 
that the source of most retractions is high impact journals. This would suggest that all of 
science would require the level of scrutiny afforded to the most well publicized articles to 
ferret out fraudulent activities. Notwithstanding these problematic figures, fraud remains 
a serious concern in the sciences. Each individual instance of fraud, particularly when it 
                                                 
65 Gina Kolata, Inquiry Lacking Due Process, N. Y. Times, June 25, 1996, at C3 (quoting 
Robert Charrow). 
66 Lucy Odling-Smee, Jim Giles, Ichiko Fuyuno, David Cyranoski & Emma Marris, 
Misconduct Special: Where Are They Now?, 445 Nature 244, 245 (2007). 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Editorial, Beautification and Fraud, 8 Nature Cell Biology 101, 101 (2006). It is unlikely, 
though, that any change to peer review could actually beef up our fraud detection abilities. Peer 
reviewers therefore must be more vigilant in their efforts to find fraudulent data. They have to 
stay watchful but not distrustful.  
70 Laura Bonetta, The Aftermath of Scientific Fraud, 124 Cell 873, 875 (2006) (saying of the 
2700 allegations of fraud submitted to ORI, there have been to date only 160 findings of actual 
fraud). 
71 Sara B. Nath et al., Retractions in the Research Literature: Misconduct or Mistakes?, 185 
Med. J. Austl. 152, 152-53 (2006). 
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is well publicized, further erodes the public trust in science and the funding that comes 
with that trust.72 
 
 
C. Repercussions of Fraud 
 
 
1. Loss to the General Public  
 
Of greatest concern is the threat to human health and life when there is fraud in 
science, particularly in biomedical science and FDA clinical trials.73 Scientists who 
commit fraud at this level should be held to higher standards and punished with more 
rigorous sanctions.74 
The Federal Budget for 2006 proposed nearly 128 billion dollars for federally 
supported research and development, comprising nearly 20% of the discretionary 
budget.75 Officially, health related research receives almost 29 billion dollars and general 
science receives 6.5 billion dollars, but the Departments of Defense and Energy are also 
major recipients of federal funds and grants for basic science research. Whatever the 
eventual total, the taxpayer is spending a lot on science and therefore has a legitimate 
right to know that this large chunk of money is being put toward noble and useful 
causes.76 When a researcher uses government money to fund his or her fraudulent 
activities, he or she not only squanders taxpayer dollars, but also imposes an opportunity 
                                                 
72 Jordan J. Cohen, A Word from the President: Research Integrity is Job One, Ass‘n of Am. 
Med. Colleges Reporter, Sept. 2005, available at 
http://www.aamc.org/newsroom/reporter/sept05/word.htm (―Few things are more damaging to 
the reputation of academic medicine than published instances of scientific ‗misconduct.‘‖).  See 
also Alison Abbott & Phillip Graf, Survey Reveals Mixed Feelings Over Scientific Misconduct, 
424 Nature 117, 117 (2003) (―[I]ncreased reporting of research misconduct in the media . . . is 
damaging public confidence in science.‖). 
73 But see Marc Buyse et al., The Role of Biostatistics in the Prevention, Detection and 
Treatment of Fraud in Clinical Trials, 18 Stat. Med. 3435, 3436 (1999) (―Many instances of fraud 
in clinical trials, although morally reprehensible, have a negligible impact on the trial's scientific 
conclusions.‖). 
74 See, e.g., Barbara K. Redman & Arthur L. Caplan, Off with Their Heads: The Need to 
Criminalize Some Forms of Scientific Misconduct, 33 J.L. Med. & Ethics 345, 347 (2005). This 
seems a little hyperbolic. Human lives are rarely if ever at stake when basic science researchers 
commit fraud. In fact, given the inherent replication component in the process of science, one 
could argue the opposite, that individual acts of fraud rarely have serious implications because 
other researchers always question and re-test results. 
75 See, e.g., Bromley, supra note 10. 
76 John D. Dingell, In Science Fraud Case, Justice is Denied; Valid Concerns, N.Y. Times, 
July 2, 1996, at A14 (―We must do better to insure that scientific research maintains the trust of 
the American people, which underlies the commitment of taxpayer dollars.‖).  
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cost on more morally inclined researchers who could have used some (more) of the 
public‘s funding. 
 Additionally, in the competitive patenting environment, particularly in the United 
States where patent interference actions are an integral part of establishing priority and 
patents are awarded to the first to invent, unscrupulous scientists have held up peer 
review processes,77 or have used information from a publication for their own advantage 
in close patent races.78 Patents are an important component of the technology transfer 
mechanism in many countries, including the United States. Illegitimately holding up the 
patenting process prevents technologies from reaching the public where they can be 
commercialized and used to the public‘s advantage. Many of those inventions are not 
published until their patent rights are belatedly assured. 
 Regrettably, it seems that there are often no hard and fast rules to prevent such 
occurrences in the peer review process. Journals tend to be terse in describing their rules 
on the confidentiality of peer reviews.79 Neither journals nor local or national police 
forces may even have jurisdiction over a peer reviewer, who may not be in the same 
country as the journal and may not be punishable under local laws.80 The international 
nature of science suggests that a uniform and universal system needs to be created to 
determine what ought to be considered fraud and how it should be punished.  
 
 
2. Losses to Science 
 
Science relies on prior research to push forward and innovate. Notwithstanding 
conventional wisdom that may imply otherwise, most experiments are not independently 
replicated by other labs, limiting the ability of scientists to ever uncover their peers‘ 
fraud; repetition may occur within the lab conducting the experiment in question as 
verification prior to actual publishing, but different labs rarely repeat complicated 
experiments conducted by their peers.81 
                                                 
77 For example, tampering with evidence that might show that an inventor was the first to 
invent. See, e.g., Edwin Flores Troy, Publish and Perish: Patentability Aspects of Peer Review 
Misconduct, 5 Tex. Intell. Prop. L. J. 47, 48 (1996) (noting that even with peer reviewers signing 
a confidentiality agreement, the simple violation of that contract will destroy an inventor‘s right 
to patent). 
78 See, e.g., Eliot Marshall, Suit Alleges Misuse of Peer Review, 270 Sci. 1912, 1912 (1995). 
79 Journals counter that they rarely see evidence of misuse or misconduct among their peer 
reviewers. See, e.g., id. at 1913 (citing John Maddox, editor of Nature).  
80 Troy, supra note 77, at 63. 
81 See, e.g., Baltimore, supra note 3, at 285 (―[G]iven the many variables that differentiate one 
laboratory environment from another, the inability to repeat a result is not particularly surprising. 
[Additionally] there are too many interesting questions abroad for many scientists to be willing to 
repeat an observation with any exactitude. Repetition is just not as exciting as finding something 
new.‖); see also Jim Giles, The Trouble with Replication, 442 Nature 344, 344 (2006) (―[M]any 
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Moreover, the specialization of scientists into sub-specialties and their associated 
jargon has Balkanized much of the literature to a point where research papers and their 
arcane language are often only accessible to the small initiated subfield. The complex 
verbiage shuts out the vast majority of other scientists. Researchers cannot afford to 
spend limited resources and time following up on a result outside of their specific 
purview of knowledge, thus leaving unexposed results that are fraudulent or fabricated. 
 David Baltimore nevertheless argues that while repetition does not occur, there 
are other forms of verification that can limit the negative effects of scientific misconduct 
within the scientific literature.82 ―[S]cience will root out ineffective ideas, however they 
were generated;‖83  and although the ―mills of science grind slowly[,] . . . they grind 
exceedingly small‖ with the result that irreproducible results will eventually get 
sidelined.84 
 Even if fraud would not result in long term harm to the body of scientific 
knowledge, there are other potential negative effects: (i) allegations of cheating in science 
create a stigma that engulfs the entire scientific community; (ii) charges of fraud 
delegitimize the profession of science in the eyes of the public; 85 and (iii) when an 
individual commits or is suspected of committing fraud, the careers of coauthors, 
colleagues, students, and collaborators all potentially suffer. 86 Even suspected fraud has a 
negative effect on science.87 
                                                                                                                                                 
papers, especially in minor journals, go unreplicated simply because of lack of interest (a third of 
all papers are never again cited in the scientific literature).‖). 
82 These include, principally, the incorporation of prior results into the design of a new 
experiment: if the new experiment doesn‘t work, the experimenter may not even care to verify the 
result, but rather, she will just publish a limitation on that result‘s applicability. As further 
experiments relying on the original experiment fail, its applicability becomes even more cabined, 
until the scientific community no longer considers it applicable and consigns it to some sort of 
literary limbo. Baltimore, supra note 3, at 287 (―[L]iterature has millions of such papers in it, 
ones that made no positive contribution to the ongoing process of accumulation of knowledge.‖).  
83 
In summary, the publication of false data is morally wrong, disruptive, and 
eroding of one of the key currencies of science, trust. But its effects are transient 
and easily absorbed within the ordinary activities of science and, I dare say, most 
fabrication is probably not unmasked but has little long-term result because the 
processes of science handle the problem. 
Id. at 290. 
84 Cherry Murray & Saswato Das, The Price of Scientific Freedom, 2 Nature Materials 204, 
205 (2003).  
85 See, e.g., Chubin, supra note 43, at 175.  
86 See, e.g., Bonetta, supra note 70, at 873. 
87 See generally Daniel Kevles, The Baltimore Case: A Trial of Politics, Science, and 
Character (1998). 
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 Importantly, fraud in science invites outside regulation and oversight. While a 
more transparent scientific process may help promote faith in scientists and their 
endeavors, regulations might negatively affect trust within the scientific community, 
turning every colleague into a potential disgruntled whistleblower.88 
 
 
3. Normal Misbehavior 
 
 There may be positive externalities associated with some lesser forms of scientific 
fraud, particularly in the outer reaches of cutting edge scientific research where it might 
be necessary to bend the rules. Science, as a self-policing profession, creates often 
extensive, entangled rules to prevent misconduct and fraud. But in some instances, 
scientists may be able to break the rules without actually going over the line. It is in these 
instances where science can and does benefit from misconduct. The aforementioned great 
scientists accused of fraud are particularly good examples of this practice, sometimes 
substituting what they knew must be correct for their actual error-tinged experimental 
results.89 
 For example, while it may be wrong to commingle funds from different grants, 
funding for controversial or unproven technologies is often hard to come by. And 
although mixing funds from different sources is a slippery slope and often easy to justify 
for the cash-strapped and morally confident scientist, a number of important scientific 
discoveries have probably resulted from misused grant funds.  
 Additionally, experienced scientists might drop outliers in their data or add in 
fudge factors,90 relying not on scientific rigor but on honed hunches, justifying the 
disposal of those points as spurious. Again, dropping data points without scientific 
justification may border on falsification of data, or not. The gut reaction, acceptable in 
                                                 
88 LaFollette, supra note 30, at 211.  
 
[T]he initial [limited]  reactions of many scientists who purported to speak for 
all of science, coupled with delays in university investigations and the 
development of ethics codes, not only resulted in further expansion of the federal 
regulatory presence on university campuses but also helped to create a situation 
in which an accusation of misconduct, whether warranted or not, can now trigger 
years of expensive and time-consuming litigation. 
Id. 
89  See supra notes 22, 23, 25, and 26. 
90 Possibly most famously, Albert Einstein added a cosmological constant into his theory of 
General Relativity. See, e.g., Sten Odenwald, Einstein's Cosmic Fudge Factor, 81 Sky & 
Telescope 362, 362 (1991). Note that although Einstein later retracted this constant, his hunch 
may be vindicated. Press Release, University of Toronto, Was Einstein's Biggest Blunder a 
Stellar Success? (Nov. 22, 2005), available at, 
http://www.cfht.hawaii.edu/News/SNLS_Nov2005/SNLS_AAS_PR.html (reporting findings of 
the Canada-France-Hawaii Telescope‘s SuperNova Legacy Survey).  
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III. POLICY SUGGESTIONS FOR DEALING WITH FRAUD 
 
 
A. Setting Standards92 
 
The lack of established procedures for dealing with academic fraud is a major 
concern.93 ―There is no more important task in dealing with misconduct and promoting 
integrity in scientific research than developing standards of research conduct.‖94 Still, 
there is no universal understanding of what exactly can be defined as fraud.95 And even 
within the established procedures, there remains no rigorous systematic process for 
                                                 
91 See, e.g., Raymond de Vries et al., Normal Misbehavior: Scientists Talk about the Ethics of 
Research, 1 J. Empirical Res. on Hum. Res. Ethics 43, 45 (2006). 
 
One gray area that I am fascinated by . . . is culling data based on your 
‗experience.‘ . . . [T]here was one real famous episode in our field . . . [where] it 
was clear that some of the results had just been thrown out. . . . [When] queried 
[the researchers] . . . said, ‗Well we have been doing this for 20 years, we know 
when we‘ve got a spurious result . . . .‘ [When that happens] . . . [d]o you go back 
and double check it or do you just throw it out . . . [and] do you tell everybody 
you threw it out? I wonder how much of that goes on? (quoting a scientist-
interviewee). 
Id. 
92 Many contend that the actual setting of a standard is not the important part of the process. 
For example, Pigman and Carmichael note that the actions leading up to the establishment of any 
creed is a useful exercise, as it will create and foster dialogue. Pigman & Carmichael, supra note 
45, at 647 (―What matters is that scientific men should argue and discuss the matter of scientific 
ethics as one of infinite importance to themselves and the rest of mankind with the same honesty, 
humility and resolute regard for the facts they show in their scientific work.‖ (quoting A.V. Hill)). 
93 Marcia Angell, Fraud in Science, 219 Sci. 1417, 1418 (1983).  
94 Frankel, supra note 11, at 217 (―[T]he scientific community has a responsibility to its 
members and to society at large to define as precisely as possible what constitutes accepted 
practices . . . .‖). 
95 See generally Geoff Brumfiel, Misconduct? It‟s All Academic, 445 Nature 240, 240 (2007) 
(noting that academia‘s approach to scientific misconduct is ―riddled with inconsistencies‖). In 
light of the potential civil and criminal penalties, exacting standards need to be set. Still, the 
standards need to be flexible so that they can be applied to often complex cases. See, e.g., 
Bratislav Stankovic, Comment, Pulp Fiction: Reflections on Scientific Misconduct, 2004 Wis. L. 
Rev. 975, 1007 (2004). Additionally, if there are to be criminal penalties, a specific level of mens 
rea also needs to be defined. Id. at 1006. 
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dealing with many of the issues raised by science fraud. 96 This is an old and continuing 
problem: ―[t]he absence of norms . . . was [also] symptomatic of the neglect of research 
ethics in the decades leading to the 1980s.‖97 
Current efforts by academic institutions to deal with fraud have proved capricious 
and incomplete: investigations are often drawn out and time consuming; those involved 
with the investigatory process typically do not have the proper legal and scientific 
training; and in the end, most universities are unwilling to admit to a fraudulent event out 
of fear that it will tarnish their reputation, lead to libel suits, and hurt faculty morale. 
 Setting consistent and universal standards should be the first priority in dealing 
with science fraud; it is easier to ―weigh behavior against pre-established standards‖98 
than to deal with each issue de novo and without any precedent. However, codifying 
morality is difficult,99 and given the international nature of present-day science research, 
setting standards that work across all cultures is a complex problem. 100 
 It is important that scientists devise these standards, rather than outside 
governmental forces.101 Even the United States government acknowledges academia‘s 
concern over incorporating law enforcement and the judiciary into scientific disputes, 
particularly the adversarial culture that involving the legal system would create. 102 
Lawyers and policy makers tend toward broad, amorphous, and unrealistic standards,103 
                                                 
96 See, e.g., Gary Taubes, Misconduct: Views from the Trenches, 261 Sci. 1108, 1108 (1993); 
see also Brumfiel, supra note 95, at 240. 
97 Online Research Ethics Course, 
http://ori.hhs.gov/education/products/montana_round1/research_ethics.html (last visited Oct. 28, 
2008) (quoting Caroline Whitebeck).  
98 Julius S. Youngner, The Scientific Misconduct Process: A Scientist's View from the Inside, 
279 JAMA 62, 64 (1998). 
99 See Stankovic, supra note 95, at 1005. 
100 Funding agencies, like the NSF, have often been at the forefront of setting such standards. 
See, e.g.,  Research Misconduct Definitions, 45 C.F.R. § 689.1(a) (2007). But science societies 
and journals with their international clout and presence may be prime candidates for creating such 
standards. See, e.g., Pieter J. Drenth, President of All European Academies, Scientific Integrity 
and Social Responsibility: The Role of Academies of Sciences and Humanities, Address at the 
2005 World Science Forum Budapest (Nov. 10-12, 2005).  
101 See generally infra note 107. 
102 Public Health Service Policies on Research Misconduct, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,369, 28,370 (May 
17, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 50, 93). 
103  
Science fraud is, at least in some ways, a very real problem. But the political 
and legal system‘s efforts to deal with it in the standard way, by setting up an 
ethics bureaucracy and promulgating formal rules based on appearances has been 
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whereas scientists favor definitive and narrow standards that lessen uncertainty, 104 which 
often has a chilling effect on science. 
 ―[T]here is a notable clash of cultures between the disciplines of law and science, 
and nowhere is this clash more evident than in the lengthy, but still very current, battle 
over appropriate definitions, rules and procedures concerning legal controls over 
scientific misconduct.‖105 Scientists have to know, particularly if their actions are to be 
criminalized, what the government considers to be fraud, so as to not unnecessarily chill 




B. What Should be Considered Fraud or Misconduct 
 
Any definition of fraud should presumably attempt to be unambiguous107 and 
narrow. Additionally, whatever the definition of fraud is, it is important that it strives to 
be universal, as the shoulders that we stand on and rely on could be anywhere in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
an abject failure . . . . ‗[ORI] was after something abstract and elusive. ORI 
wanted scientists to be perfect.‘  
Glenn Harlan Reynolds, “Thank God for the Lawyers”: Some Thoughts on the (Mis)Regulation 
of Scientific Misconduct, 66 Tenn. L. Rev. 801, 814 (1999) (quoting Malcolm Gladwell). 
104 Howard Schachman, From “Publish or Perish” to “Patent and Prosper”, 281 J. Biological 
Chemistry 6889, 6898 (2005). 
105 Jesse A. Goldner, The Unending Saga of Legal Controls Over Scientific Misconduct: A 
Clash of Cultures Needing Resolution, 24 Am. J.L. & Med. 293, 293 (1998).  
106 While the legal profession may be used to dealing with such types of standards, particularly 
those that are designed to be narrowed and defined over time by case law, this concept is foreign 
to science. See, e.g., Letter from Ralph A. Bradshaw, President Fed‘n of Am. Societies for 
Experimental Biology, Coalition of Biological Sci., to William F. Raub, Sci. Advisor, Office of 
Sci. Policy, Dep‘t of Health & Hum. Servs. (May 13, 1996), available at 
http://opa.faseb.org/pdf/crisraub.pdf. 
107 A difficulty in finding an unambiguous definition is that ambiguity is inherent in scientific 
research, making it difficult to draw a clear line as to what is acceptable and what is not. See, e.g., 
Frederick Grinnell, Truth, Fairness, and the Definition of Scientific Misconduct, 129 J. Lab. & 
Clinical Med.189, 189-90 (1997). Grinnell notes that what some may think of as fraudulent, 
others consider a proper research technique. Id. at 190. Grinell, quoting the autobiography of Rita 
Levi-Montalcini, 1986 Nobel Prize Laureate in Physiology or Medicine, noted that Professor 
Levi-Montalcini applied what some have termed ―the law of disregard of negative information . . 
. facts that fit into a preconceived hypothesis attract attention, are singled out, and remembered. 
Facts that are contrary to it are disregarded, treated as exception, and forgotten.‖ Id. Grinnell 
subsequently notes that research papers only present selected data, in an unnatural order, lacking 
all the false starts and mistakes along the way in the experimental process; is this revisionist 
history, the scientific paper, a fraud? Id. at 191. An ambiguous definition of fraud may encompass 
such actions.  
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world. Yet, at the same time, misconduct concerns need to be specific to a given area of 
science – distinguishing between norms, for example, in clinical and basic science 
research108 or in academia and industry.109 
Conceptually, one could envision a multi-tiered system of different degrees of 
fraud, with corresponding levels of punishment for each violation. 110 Tiers could be filled 
differently, depending on the norms of the particular branch of science. Even within a 
relatively narrow definition of scientific misconduct,111 it seems unfair to punish all 
actions equally, especially given the career ending outcomes that can arise from being 
accused and/or convicted of fraud.112 Such a tiered system might be similar in its design 
to typical assault statutes. These tiers could be applied to most general cases of fraud and 
misconduct, although there may be notable instances where the tiered system would 
break down. 
Outside of universal moral and ethical considerations, science should primarily be 
concerned with fraudulent scientific activity insofar as it impedes innovation or the 
progress of science. Thus, in examining fraudulent actions, this article proposes that 
every analysis begin with two components. The first component of the analysis looks to 
the person committing the act: what is her motivation and intent? The second component 
looks to the eventual action: what is the actual or potential outcome of this event, vis-à-
vis scientific progress? While legal definitions might treat both components of the 
analysis equally, science should be principally concerned with fraudulent actions that, at 
a minimum, impact the second component of the analysis. Those that only involve the 
                                                 
108 See, e.g., Frederick Grinnell, Misconduct: Acceptable Practices Differ by Field, 436 Nature 
776, 776 (2005). 
109 See, e.g., Floyd E. Bloom, Editorial, Unseemly Competition, 287 Sci.  589, 589 (2000) 
(noting that FFP is rare and there are other more insidious forms of misconduct that are often 
justified by the perpetrators).  
110 See Grinnell, supra note 108, who gives three criteria for defining misconduct: i) that the 
actions are never part of scientific practice, ii) that the single action is sufficient to show 
misconduct, and iii) that there is a specific intent to deceive, implicit in the action of the offender. 
These criteria seem, though, to exclude most of the authorship issues that are endemic to science, 
and that are included in the Vancouver Guidelines. See Int‘l Comm. of Med. J. Eds., Uniform 
Requirements for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals: Writing and Editing for 
Biomedical Publication (2008), available at http://www.icmje.org/ [hereinafter Vancouver 
Guidelines]. 
111 See Jocelyn Kaiser, Policing of Science: A Misconduct Definition that Finally Sticks?, 286 
Sci. 391, 391 (1999)  (noting how many are concerned that broad, open-ended definitions of 
misconduct could chill innovation).  
112 Peter Hofschneider, emeritus director at the Max Planck Institute for Biochemistry, notes 
that young scientists ―should not necessarily have their whole research career destroyed because 
of one misdemeanor.‖ Abbott and Graf, supra note 72. Note also comments from a survey where 
it was found that many scientists felt that it was ―unrealistic to demand strict adherence to good 
scientific practice in all circumstances.‖ Even an indictment with a subsequent exoneration can 
hurt a scientist‘s career. Id. at 117. 
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first component, but have little to no bearing on the second,  ought not to be as great a 
concern to science. 
This relatively simple-minded analysis can be used to distinguish among general 
categories of fraudulent activity. In addition, the analysis might also be used to find 
particular instances where an activity, while otherwise not truly fraudulent, might be 
considered fraudulent given the totality of the circumstances. Thus additional information 
regarding the pattern of occurrences, the impact on others, the scientist‘s state of mind, 
and the actions relative to the community standards are very much relevant to any 
investigation into scientific misconduct.113 Intent may also be an important component 
here, and, when viewed on a case-by-case basis, instances of scientific misconduct should 
be differentiated based on whether there was malicious intent, recklessness, or 
negligence. 
With this distinction in mind we can subdivide what was once globally lumped 
together as fraud into distinctive tiers – each tier successively having a lesser negative 
effect on science.114 
 
 
1. First Tier Fraud 
 
A first-tier fraudulent activity would include activities that have damaging effects 
on the entire scientific system. These would include cases of misconduct such as the 
fabrication or falsification of data. Such conduct has the potential to significantly impair 
scientific research, as research builds upon prior knowledge within the body of science. 
Thus, if data is fabricated or false, all subsequent downstream research has the potential 
to suffer. Scientists involved in that research will have to endure wasted time, resources, 
and lost productivity. And, if the fraud remains undiscovered, there is also the potential 
for a negative impact on downstream technological or clinical applications.115 Society 
                                                 
113 Christine C. Boesz, Investigations & International Cooperation, Presentation at the ESF-
ORI First World Conference on Research Integrity (Sept. 16-19, 2007).  
114 But see Brian Martin, Scientific Fraud and the Power Structure of Science, 10 Prometheus 
83, 83 (1992), available at http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/92prom.html (noting 
that fraud is not ―clear-cut‖).115 See, e.g., Katherine Unger & Jennifer Couzin, Cleaning Up the 
Paper Trail, 312 Sci. 38, 41 (2006) (The authors found that there have been instances where fraud 
has been found in basic science research that have resulted in questioning clinical applications 
based on that data. Just imagine someone in New Zealand reads this paper and says, ―That‘s cool. 
I can do this with my Patients.‖) (citations omitted).  
115 See, e.g., Katherine Unger & Jennifer Couzin, Cleaning Up the Paper Trail, 312 Sci. 38, 41 
(2006) (The authors found that there have been instances where fraud has been found in basic 
science research that have resulted in questioning clinical applications based on that data. Just 
imagine someone in New Zealand reads this paper and says, ―That‘s cool. I can do this with my 
Patients.‖) (citations omitted).  
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relies on the accuracy of the scientific record in every step of the scientific discovery 
process – to knowingly add bad information hurts everyone, potentially severely.116 
This type of fraud/misconduct also typically implies a specific intent to deceive; 
given that science relies heavily on trust, such actions hurt science globally as they tend 
to erode trust and promote cynicism among fellow scientists. One could also imagine that 
an undisclosed conflict of interest would also be considered first tier fraud as it seriously 
undermines the veracity of the data created. 
 
 
2. Second Tier Fraud 
 
 A lesser violation of fraud might include plagiarism.117 While unquestionably an 
unethical act,118 the repercussions of the action are less severe,119 and not as likely to 
harm the institution of science as a first tier type action.120 
 For example, one form of plagiarism that particularly offends the publishing 
community is that of self-plagiarizing.121 Although currently not well-defined, self-
plagiarism can range from outright malicious attempts to use previously published 
material to fraudulently enhance one‘s curriculum vitae to the less serious reuse of an 
introduction from an older paper in a more recent publication. Here, although it does 
bring redundancy to the corpus of scientific literature, and may create an extra burden on 
editors and reviewers, these types of plagiarism do not damage the authenticity of the 
research, and as such should not be deemed as egregious as tier one fraudulent activities. 
                                                 
116 See Editorial, Complacency about Misconduct, 427 Nature 1, 1 (2004) (noting that most 
journals do nothing to combat plagiarism); see also Editorial, Clamp Down On Copycats, 438 
Nature 2, 2 (2005). 
117 But see Shawn G. Clouthier, Plagiarism Erodes Scientific Integrity, 301 Sci. 311, 311 
(2005). 
118 See, e.g., Brian Martin, Academic Credit Where It's Due, 7 Campus Rev. 11, 1 (1997) 
(―Plagiarism is often treated like a mortal sin. It is assumed to happen only rarely and to warrant 
the most extreme penalties when discovered. Students are warned against perpetrating this 
heinous crime and then, if discovered, may be given a fail for an essay or sometimes an entire 
course.‖); see also COSEPUP Report, supra note 6, at 17 (noting that ―forfeited recognition to 
others, and feelings of personal betrayal-can be devastating‖). 
119 See Kreutzberg, supra note 22, at 331(loosely analogizing scientific misconduct to doping 
in professional sports because just as other athletes see doping as an unfair advantage, other 
scientists see plagiarism, or receiving credit for work one didn‘t do, as an unfair advantage over 
one‘s peers).  
120 See, e.g., Random Samples: Kinder, Gentler Plagiarism Policy?, 283 Sci. 483, 483 (1999) 
(noting that Johns Hopkins University required only that Assistant Professor Anish Bhardwaj 
give a public apology after it was discovered that he plagiarized 40% of a recent editorial).  
121 Jim Giles, Taking on the Cheats, 435 Nature 258, 258 (2005).  
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This article is not advocating that plagiarism is a victimless crime122– those whose ideas 
are stolen are obviously harmed to some degree. Instead, this article simply advocates 
that scientific progress is typically not harmed through plagiarism, and not to the same 
extent that results from falsification and fabrication. 
 Richard Posner, a Federal Circuit Judge for the Seventh Circuit, suggests that the 
communal abhorrence of plagiarism be toned down, narrowing the definition to include 
instances of outright fraud, which require harm to others as an integral compone nt. 
Plagiarism, Judge Posner opines, should only include instances where there is harm to 
competitors, the audience, or the source.123 
 It is not clear to this author why plagiarism is most often associated with the 
greater offenses of fraud and fabrication. Perhaps this association can be explained by 
analogizing plagiarism and its lesser, sister offense, the failure to properly acknowledge a 
source, to the legal evidentiary rule of chain of custody. This evidentiary rule is part of 
the requirement of authentication or identification of evidence. It is designed to remove 
any doubt as to the identity and authenticity of a piece of evidence, 124 and is most often 
                                                 
122 See, e.g., Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, Newsmakers, 317 Sci. 1841, 1841 (2007), for the 
comments made by Nicholas Steneck at the first World Conference on Research Integrity.  
123 Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Plagiarism, Forbes, Jan. 29, 2007, at 32.  
124 See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 901.  
 
Rule 901. Requirement of Authentication or Identification  
General provision. The requirement of authentication or identification as a 
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support 
a finding that the matter in question is what its proponent claims. 
Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not by way of limitation, the 
following are examples of authentication or identification conforming with the 
requirements of this rule: (1) Testimony of witness with knowledge. Testimony 
that a matter is what it is claimed to be.  
 . . .  
(4) Distinctive characteristics and the like. Appearance, contents, substance, 
internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics, taken in conjunction with 
circumstances. 
Id.; see also Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, Weinstein‘s Federal Evidence  § 901.03 
(Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2008) (1975). 
 
The chain of custody method is not mentioned in Rule 901(b)'s list of 
illustrative methods of authentication. However, it can be viewed as a hybrid 
form of listed methods. It involves both the testimony of one or more witnesses 
with knowledge . . . and the distinctive characteristics of the evidence, taken in 
conjunction with circumstances (Rule 901(b)(4) . . . .) 
Weinstein & Berger, supra at §901.03. 
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used, although not exclusively, in criminal cases.125 For example, in proffering evidence 
of a defendant‘s possession of an illicit substance, the prosecutor has to provide an 
accounting of the whereabouts of the illicit substance, from the moment of its seizure 
from the suspect and, throughout its custody. In this manner, the illicit substance is 
authenticated at the final destination, in the court, as belonging to the defendant. The 
probative value and the strictness with which this rule is applied are directly related to the 
value of the evidence and the importance associated with the unchanged condition of the 
evidence.126 Note, however, that the burden of proof in establishing the chain of custody 
is relatively light: reasonable probability.127 
 In this metaphor, the publishing researcher, like someone presenting evidence, 
attests to a finding, and, by ascribing the finding to herself and her co-authors, she 
personally vouches to the authenticity of her findings. As subsequent researchers cite this 
work in their own research, they elongate the chain of custody of scientific knowledge 
that stretches back to the originator of the scientific finding. If this testimony is based on 
fraudulent foundations, because it is plagiarized, or the proper people were not 
acknowledged, then, like custodial negligence in evidence, the chain becomes broken and 
we cannot reliably authenticate the results of the experiment. Thus, like fraud and 
fabrication, plagiarism too might be seen as a type of misconduct that threatens to 
undermine the authenticity of the data. 
 But the metaphor breaks down (unless the evidentiary item is readily 
identifiable)128 because, without the evidentiary chain of custody for either fungible 129 or 
laboratory analyzed evidence,130 a court cannot and will not conclude that the evidence 
presented in court is categorically the evidence taken from the defendant or that the 
condition of the evidence is unchanged from its original state. In contrast, a plagiarized 
scientific work does not present an authenticity problem to the same extent. By 
definition, in finding an act of plagiarism, we definitively identify the real author, who 
can then authenticate the work. In evidence this is usually not possible once the chain is 
broken. 
 Still, there remains the possibility of numerous negative consequences emanating 
from plagiarized work, although not as certain as the consequences from a first tier type 
action. It may cost funding agencies a lost opportunity: where would the money have 
gone if not to the plagiarizing scientist who does not add anything to the body of 
                                                 
125 United States v. Ricco, 52 F.3d 58, 61-62 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Collado, 957 
F.2d 38, 39 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Casto, 889 F.2d 562, 568 (5th Cir. 1989); United 
States v. Mendel, 746 F.2d 155, 166-67 (2d Cir. 1984).  
126 United States v. Lampson, 627 F.2d 62, 65-66 (7th Cir. 1980).  
127 United States v. Brown, 482 F.2d 1226, 1228 (8th Cir. 1973).  
128 State v. Conley, 288 N.E.2d 296, 300 (Ohio Ct. App. 1971). 
129 Paul Giannelli, Chain of Custody and the Handling of Real Evidence, 20 Am. Crim. L. 
Rev. 527, 534 (1983). 
130 See, e.g., Robinson v. Commonwealth, 183 S.E.2d 179, 180 (Va. 1971). 
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scientific knowledge? Plagiarism can also potentially impac t the scientist who was 
plagiarized,131 for she may lose out on credit, honor, increased funding, or advancement 
due to her for her discoveries.132 Notwithstanding these outcomes and the fact tha t 
plagiarism is one of the most common allegations made in the scientific community, 
actual misconduct is rarely found in the examination of an accusation of plagiarism. 133 
 Second tier fraud might also include abuse of the peer review process for personal 
gain by either misappropriating proprietary information or delaying publication of an 
otherwise legitimate paper. Like plagiarism, there are limited numbers of victims in this 
case. Although it could be argued that given the importance and centrality of the peer 
review system in the scientific enterprise, any abuse of the system undermines all of 




                                                 
131 A scientist who is plagiarized, if desired, can sue in court for misappropriation of her ideas 
as an alternative to going through academic channels. See, e.g., Eliot Marshall, Two Former Grad 
Students Sue Over Alleged Misuse of Ideas, 284 Sci. 562, 563 (1999) (Nevertheless, this is a 
complicated issue for a lay jury and judge: ―The judge, and possibly a jury, might be asked to rule 
in a few days on who contributed what to a complex scientific proof – the kind of controversy 
that can take years to resolve among mathematicians.‖).  
132 Would a definition of plagiarism include the very common and accepted co-authorship by 
senior professors who provided little if anything to the research, the so called ―honorary 
plagiarism?‖ ―Many senior scientists don‘t allow new graduates to take credit for their own ideas. 
I feel that this is a particularly insidious form of plagiarism, and it's not new.‖ Id. (citing an 
Australian Newspaper article.). Is this type of activity, where senior officers take away some of 
the credit from the real authors, similar to the usual type of plagiarism? Is this even an ethical 
issue or one of research etiquette? See, e.g., Brian Martin, Plagiarism: A Misplaced Emphasis, 3 
J. of Info. Ethics 36 (1994) (―[C]ompetitive plagiarism is given too much attention and 
condemned in far too extreme terms [and] institutionalized plagiarism deserves more attention.‖).  
133 Dr. Alan Price of the Office of Research Integrity suggests some reasons why this may be 
the case:  
 
(1) [T]he cases were resolved based on the evidence before reaching the level 
of an investigation; (2) institutional committees had difficulty determining 
ownership of the words or ideas of people who had worked together as 
collaborators, student/mentor, or investigator/co-investigator; or (3) the 
allegations involved such a minimal copying of words without quotation marks 
or complete citations that investigations were not warranted. Even in cases with 
significant allegations, many institutions have given reprimands without reaching 
findings of misconduct.  
Office of Res. Integrity & Am. Assoc. for Advancement of Sci., Executive 
Summary of the ORI/AAAS Conference on Plagiarisms and Theft of Ideas, June 
21-22, 1993, at the National Institutes of Health Lister Hill Auditorium Bethesda, 
Maryland 12 (Alan Price ed. 1993), available at 
http://ori.dhhs.gov/documents/aaas.pdf. 




3. Third Tier Fraud 
 
 A third level of fraud may include actions such as salami slicing papers, or 
duplicate publications.134 Plagiarism involving background or methodological sections in 
papers would be included here as well. Other potential acts of misconduct might include 
claiming authorship on a paper one provided negligible work towards,135 data 
beautification by manipulating and cleaning up images of results, 136 citation and 
quotation errors,137 the misrepresentation of credentials,138 and failures in either animal 
welfare or human subject research regulations. 139 While each of these third tier types of 
misconduct has, like the other tiers, the potential to do serious damage to the scientific 
infrastructure, on the whole they are relatively benign toward both the general institution 
of science and the validity of the underlying science. Many of Martinson‘s types of fraud 
may fit within this tier.140 Still, Bruce Alberts and others raise arguments along the lines 
of New York Mayor Rudolph Giuliani's focus on quality of life crimes in the early 1990s: 
it is the lower level fraud that is the worst, as it erodes the base and will eventually, if not 
punished, lead to higher and more problematic levels of fraud. 141 
                                                 
134 Studies have shown that duplicate publications, estimated to be around twenty-five 
thousand per year, cost science up to 25 million dollars per year. Drenth, The Responsible 
Conduct of Basic and Clinical Research, supra note 58. One might argue that by inundating the 
body of articles with excessive publications one hurts numerous scientists who waste their time 
and resources wading through all of them.  
135 Although, ―most of the time misconducts regarding authorship will have no important 
consequences for the public‘s health, . . . they have an effect on the public perception on the 
reliability on biomedical science.‖ Ana M. Garcia, Sixth Version of the “Uniform Requirements 
for Manuscripts Submitted to Biomedical Journals”: Lots of Ethics, Some New Recommendations 
for Manuscript Preparation, 58 J. Epidemiol. Cmty. Health 731, 731 (2004). 
136 Editorial, Beautification and Fraud, supra note 69, at 101 (noting that up to 20% of 
accepted papers are cleaned up); see also Helen Pearson, Forensic Software Traces Tweaks to 
Images, 439 Nature 520, 520-21 (2006). It should be noted that this category of misconduct 
should be limited to beautification that does not create or change results.  
137 Drenth, The Responsible Conduct of Basic and Clinical Research, supra note 58. 
138 Id. Misrepresentation of credentials may be pervasive in science, but the numbers are not 
clear. 
139 Note that the National Science Foundation seems to exclude many of these from their 
definition of actionable research misconduct. See, e.g., Boesz, supra note 113. 
140 See Martinson, Anderson, &  de Vries, supra note 56, at 737. 
141 Alberts & Shine, supra note 18, at 1660. This is also known as the ‗broken windows 
theory.‘ See, e.g., James Wilson & George Kelling, Broken Windows: The Police and 
Neighborhood Safety, 249 Atlantic Monthly 29, 31 (1982); see also Kreutzberg, supra note 22, at 




4. Misconduct that Should Not Be Included as Fraud 
 
 Although some have suggested scientists be punished for negligent behavior, 142 
misconduct in science should not include ―errors of judgment; errors in recording, 
selection, or analysis of data; differences in opinions involving the interpretation of data; 
or misconduct unrelated to the research process,‖143 notwithstanding the harmful effects 
of negligence or sloppy science. 
 ―Another category of behaviors—including sexual or other forms of harassment, 
misuse of funds, gross negligence in a person's professional activities, . . . are not 
necessarily associated with scientific conduct. Institutions need to discourage and 
respond to such behaviors. But these behaviors are subject to generally applicable legal 
and social penalties and should be dealt with using the same procedures that would be 
applied to anyone.‖144 Nor should there be a rebuttable presumption of misconduct if 
records are missing; the onus should instead remain on the government to prove fraud 









                                                                                                                                                 
331,  for an additional analogy to how doping in sports starts small and grows as one sees how 
easy it is to deceive. 
142  
By introducing preventable errors into science, sloppy or negligent research 
can do great damage—even if the error is eventually uncovered and corrected. 
Though science is built on the idea of peer validation and acceptance, actual 
replication is selective. It is not practical (or necessary) to reconstruct all the 
observations and theoretical constructs that go into an investigation. Researchers 
have to trust that previous investigators performed the work as reported. If that 
trust is misplaced and the previous results are inaccurate, the truth will likely 
emerge as problems arise in the ongoing investigation. But researchers can waste 
months or years of effort because of erroneous results, and public confidence in 
the integrity of science can be seriously undermined.  
COSEPUP Report, supra note 6, at 16; see also Rebecca Dresser, Defining Scientific Misconduct: 
The Relevance of Mental State, 269 JAMA 895, 895 (1993).  
143 Bradshaw, supra note 106. 
144 COSEPUP Report, supra note 6, at 18. 
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C. Teaching of Ethical Precepts145 
 
Once the scientific community has decided what the metes and bounds of ethical 
and moral behavior are, they can be inculcated in present and future generations of 
scientists. Most importantly, the old guard has to accept that fraud is a real, important, 
and potentially pervasive issue within the scientific community; and, as such, they have 
to take the issue seriously, if for no other reason than to set a positive exa mple for the 
next generation of scientists.146 
 Most commentators agree that research ethics to be taught or imparted to graduate 
students on some formal level,147 and possibly on a continuing basis throughout their 
career,148 although it is unclear who is best suited to impart this knowledge.149 
                                                 
145 Note the conclusions of a recent report on research integrity finding that ―[t]here is a lack 
of evidence to definitively support any one way to approach the problem of promoting and 
evaluating research integrity.‖ Comm. on Assessing Integrity in Res. Env‘ts, Nat‘l Res. Council 
& Inst. of Med., Integrity in Scientific Research: Creating an Environment that Promotes 
Responsible Conduct 124 (2002) [hereinafter Integrity in Scientific Research].  
146 Drenth, The Responsible Conduct of Basic and Clinical Research, supra note 58 (―The 
majority of professional laboratory scientists are unenlightened, confused, and at times 
embarrassed at the revelations and counter-revelations, concerning the research culture, that have 
been a focus of attention in the media during the past 2 decades.‖); see also Cassidy supra note 6. 
147 But see Karen J. Maschke, What's the Professor Got to Do with It?, 2  Am. J. of Bioethics 
63, 63-64 (2002). And according to Rob Schwartz,  
 
However, we should be wary of the thought that our problem with unethical 
research can be solved by the creation of these courses. . . . .[The] thoughtful 
point that ―the key to doing good in science is doing science well‖ might suggest 
that the best ethical return on an educational investment would come from more 
or better graduate courses in statistics and epidemiology, for example, or in other 
areas of substantive science, rather than ethics. . . . Similarly, we might wonder 
how scientific research would be affected if our researchers were taught music, 
expository writing, time management, meditation, or how to work with 
colleagues more successfully. . . . Given the time demands on graduate students 
and the practicalities of their training, the question we need to ask is whether a 
formal course in research ethics is worth more than anything else those students 
could be doing with that same time. 
Rob Schwartz, The Professor is Excused, 2 Am. J. of Bioethics 59, 60 (2002) (quoting Kenneth 
Richman, Responsible Conduct of Research is All Well and Good, 2 Am. J. of Bioethics 61, 61 
(2002). 
148 See Richard Sharp, Teaching Old Dogs New Tricks: Continuing Education in Research 
Ethics, 2 Am. J. of Bioethics 55, 56 (2002). 
149 ―Above all, however, we must do more to reach out to the scientific community—senior 
scientists, postdoctoral researchers and students alike—and make them more aware of the pitfalls 







 With the monetary, social, and career costs associated with fraud, not to mention 
the bad publicity, academic institutions have a vested interest in dealing with the issue of 
fraud in science long before their students become involved. Educating students, 
researchers, and administrators in a formal educational setting about all aspects of fraud 
seems to be the most efficient and cost effective way to initially deal with research 
misconduct. Unfortunately, universities and other schools often fail to sufficiently 
prepare their students with the proper degree of moral and ethical training.  
 Scholars note that science graduate students often lack the skills to do what is 
morally correct in questionable situations within the confines of science research. 150 
Some blame this on a graduate training lacking in ethical guidance. 151 Others argue that, 
although science has not yet formalized its ethical traditions, they are passed on 
informally during graduate training.152 
 Nevertheless, many have suggested that science graduate students ought to be 
receiving a thorough formal ethical education in their undergraduate and/or graduate 
studies.153 Presently, requirements for ethics courses are typically limited to graduate and 
                                                                                                                                                 
and consequences of fraud. … [W]e need to raise awareness further.‖ Kreutzberg, supra note 22, 
at 332.  
150 See, e.g., Henriikka Clarkeburn, A Test for Ethical Sensitivity in Science, 31 J. of Moral 
Educ. 439, 452 (2002) (noting the relatively low levels of ethical sensitivity in science students 
and calling for increased ethics education). But see Stanley G. Korenman et al, Evaluation of the 
Research Norms of Scientists and Administrators Responsible for Academic Research Integrity, 
279 JAMA 41, 41 (1998) (noting that ―surveyed scientists and institutional representatives had 
strong and similar norms of professional behavior‖).  
151 See, e.g., Robert Cowen, The Not So Hallowed Halls of Science, 86 Tech Rev. 8 (1983). 
152 See, e.g., Pigman & Carmichael, supra note 45. But see Integrity in Scientific Research, 
supra note 145, at 20 (―[M]uch less attention [has been devoted] . . . to the task of fostering a 
research environment that promotes integrity.‖).  
153 See, e.g., Integrity in Scientific Research, supra note 145, at 26 (noting the vital role 
research institutions play in providing an integrity-rich environment and citing the need for 
institutions to provide training, establish unambiguous policies, and provide support) . The report 
also sees the institution as the only consistent part of a graduate education, with individual PI‘s 
differing radically. Thus ―[r]esearch institutions should consistently and effectively provide 
training and education, policies and procedures, and tools and support systems. Institutional 
expectations should be unambiguous, and the consequences of one‘s conduct should be clear.‖ Id. 
at 26. But see, e.g., Lawrence M. Krauss, The Citizen-Scientist's Obligation to Stand Up for 
Standards, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 2003, at F3 (―[L]ike almost all scientists I know, I have no 
formal training in this subject. Indeed, like many of my colleagues, I have been reluctant to 
include formal courses on ethics in the physics curriculum, and I have tended to suppose that 
students should learn the ethos of science ‗by example.‘‖). 
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postdoctoral students with U.S. government funding.154 Although covering most graduate 
students, this will not include most foreign students and postdoctoral fellows. Courses 
should be required for all students, post docs, and even junior faculty independent of their 
source of funding. Ethics courses would optimally teach scientists the reasons behind the 
prevailing standards of research ethics, demonstrate how to responsibly investigate any 
situation that may arise during the course of their careers, and inculcate the ability to 
independently formulate ethical responses to issues and instances that occur. 155 Further, 
unlike the current situation, schools and professors must imbue these programs with a 
greater sense of importance to make students more likely to view ethics as an important 
area of knowledge. 
Given the significant time and work pressures on many graduate students, it is 
imperative that any research ethics course be given in a way that engages students. 156 
Moreover, it may be beneficial to give this course early on in graduate education, even 
prior to starting research, not only to stress the importance of ethical conduct, but also to 
assure educators that students will be properly engaged in the discussion and not 
distracted by their work.157 Unfortunately, the concept of a research ethics course is 
relatively new,158 and as such, there may be limited resources to build upon and evaluate 
in constructing a course. 
Still, any course that aims to introduce students to the literature, history, and 
issues surrounding fraud in science may still fail as a means to deter it. 159 Particularly, 
given the typical workload of a junior scientist, an ethics course may become an optimal 
opportunity to catch up on one‘s reading or sleep. 160 Moreover, even if instructors can 
                                                 
154 See, e.g., Charles E. Deutch, A Course in Research Ethics for Graduate Students, 44 C. 
Teaching 56, 57 (1996). 
155 See, e.g., Caroline Whitbeck, Teaching Ethics to Scientists and Engineers: Moral Agents 
and Moral Problems, 1 Sci. & Eng‘g Ethics 229, 229 (1995).  
156 See Alberts & Shine, supra note 18, at 1660. 
157 Although it may also be helpful to require refresher courses throughout graduate training. 
See, e.g., Ari Eisen & Roberta M. Berry, The Absent Professor: Why We Don't Teach Research 
Ethics and What to Do About It, 2 Am. J. of Bioethics 38, 39 (2002) (―We argue that it should be 
formal and explicit from the beginning, and we suggest that continuing education in research 
ethics should become an integral part of the life of the practicing bioscientist.‖).  
158 See, e.g., Ruth Ellen Bulger & Stanley Joel Reiser, Studying Science in the Context of 
Ethics, 68 Acad. Med. S5, S6 (1993) (citing a 1984 University of Texas course as the first known 
course in research ethics).  
159 See, e.g., Kenneth D. Pimple, Assessing Student Learning in Research Ethics, 4 Trends 2B 
(1997), available at http://www.indiana.edu/~poynter/tre4-2b.html (describing the failure of a 
particular research ethics course). 
160 ―Education in the responsible conduct of research is critical, but if not done appropriately 
and in a creative way, education is likely to be of only modest help and may be ineffective.‖ 
Integrity in Scientific Research, supra note 145, at 124; see also Sovacool, supra note 12, at ¶11 
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keep a student‘s attention through interesting readings and the like, by the time students 
are exposed to the ethics courses in their curriculum they are already learning primarily 
from their mentor, not the classroom.161 Finally, even if schools can provide proper 
ethical training for their graduate students, they will still probably be unable to 
thoroughly police their students.162 
Importantly, schools must also make it clear the institution will accommodate 
whistleblowers in fleshing out purported fraudulent activity and maintaining privacy. 
Graduate students and postdoctoral fellows are particularly at risk when blowing the 
whistle on their mentor. If they do nothing, their findings and publications could be 
tainted by the fraud when accusations eventually emerge. If they charge their mentor with 
fraud they risk losing their job, and when the mentor is particularly prominent or 
supported in the academic community, they also risk their reputation if their allegations 
do not stand up. 
 
b. Mentors  
 
 ―[T]he responsibility of the senior scientist [i.e. the Principal Investigator (PI)] to 
maintain the integrity of science cannot be overstated.‖ 163 Given the importance of the 
mentor relationship within the graduate education of any scientist, 164 it may be more 
beneficial for the student to learn by example from their mentor.165 Unfortunately, with 
                                                                                                                                                 
(―[E]ducation is likely to be only of modest help because it is often done non-creatively and 
implemented inappropriately.‖).  
161 Some have found ethics courses are best taught to a self-selecting, motivated group of 
students, not by requiring all students to take a course on research ethics. See Anne Koerber,  
Enhancing Ethical Behavior: Views of Students, Administrators, And Faculty, 69 J. Dental Educ. 
213, 213 (2005). 
162 While federal regulations require schools to have policies regarding science misconduct, 
there are no corresponding regulations requiring prevention or even policing of their researchers. 
See, e.g., Barbara K. Redman & Arthur L. Caplan, Off With Their Heads: The Need to 
Criminalize Some Forms of Scientific Misconduct, 33 J.L. Med. & Ethics 345, 346 (2005).  
163 Kreutzberg, supra note 22, at 331.   
164 See The Nat‘l Acad. of Sci. et al., Adviser, Teacher, Role Model, Friend: On Being a 
Mentor to Students in Science And Engineering 1-2 (1997), available at 
http://newton.nap.edu/html/mentor/1.html (for a good description of the mentor/graduate student 
relationship.); aee also Rackham Sch. of Graduate Studies, Univ. of Mich., How to Mentor 
Graduate Students: A Guide for Faculty in a Diverse University 4 (2006), available at 
http://www.rackham.umich.edu/downloads/publications/Fmentoring.pdf.  
165 A mentor‘s ―ethical, scientific, and professional behavior all leave a strong impression on 
students.‖ The Nat‘l Acad. of Sci. et al., supra note 164, at 61; see also Dan L. Burk, Research 
Misconduct: Deviance, Due Process, and the Disestablishment of Science, 3 Geo. Mason Ind. L. 
Rev. 305, 315-16 (1995) (―The habits and attitudes acquired in laboratory apprenticeship form a 
set of internalized rules that are perhaps the best safeguard for research integrity. Internalized 
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the exception of some younger mentors, most principal investigators themselves lack a 
basic education in research ethics.166 
 Moreover, even if a student‘s mentor has had an ethics education, many, if not 
most graduate students rarely have the opportunity to interact with their mentors in such a 
way that they can learn ethical norms and behavior.167 This leaves a sizable chunk of the 
scientific population without ethical training.168 
 Even those students who will be in a position to learn some ethical conduct from 
their mentors will still lack a large amount of the ethical knowledge that is required for a 
life-long career in science. They may learn from the rare example, but will not be 
inculcated with a broad understanding of ethics, nor the knowledge or methodology for 
applying what little they do learn.169 
                                                                                                                                                 
rules are continually operative without the need for external oversight or implementation.‖ Thus 
they are cheaper.)  
166 See, e.g., Eisen & Berry, supra note 157, at 42 (stating most ―[f]aculty members and 
mentors generally have received little or no formal ethics instruction themselves‖).  
167 Eisen and Berry highlight the difficulties with having a mentor be the only source of ethical 
training for graduate students: ―They endure numerous competing demands on their time and 
resources, and they are likely to be concerned that yet more demands upon them may interfere 
with the competitiveness of their labs.‖ Id. at 42. 
168 Id. at 38 (―[A] fifth of these graduate students reported that they got no help in this area. 
Most said the help their mentors provided did not qualify as effective education in research 
ethics.‖).  
169 But see generally Janet Bercovitz & Maryann Feldman, Academic Entrepreneurs: Social 
Learning and Participation in University Technology Transfer, Proceedings, 2006, at 1, available 
at 
http://www.hhh.umn.edu/centers/slp/clusters_entrepreneurship/pdf/bercovitz_academic_entrepre
neurs.pdf (noting that imprinting of social and ethical values, in their case the values related to 
technology transfer, is a real phenomenon in universities, particularly in the mentor to student 
relationship).. 
 
[P]rofessional training can instill a particular set of norms and ideas and in 
acting according to these norms, students serve as a critical conduit for the 
diffusion of new ideas and practices. . . . [I]ndividuals who trained at institutions 
where participation in technology transfer was accepted and actively practiced 
will be more likely to adopt these practices in their own careers.  
. . . . 
When faced with uncertainty about the proper course of action, social learning 
theory posits that individuals will model the behaviors of referent others. In 
addition to leaders . . . one‘s peer group acts as a relevant source of information. 
Numerous prior studies provide evidence learning activity occurs within a cohort 
of peers as individuals draw inferences about the value of alternative behaviors 
by observing the choices of ―similar‖ others. For scientists, both industrial and 
academic, local group norms have been shown to play a significant role in 
determining individual behavior.  
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2. Other Institutions 
 
 ―There is clearly a role for scientific societies to play in influencing the moral 
tone and ethical climate in which research is conducted.‖170 The scientific society is 
typically a long-term public institution, often highly visible both within the scientific 
community and to the public at large.171 Societies, as appointed representatives of a 
particular scientific community, ought to have the moral authority to teach and impose 
ethical standards upon their members.172 Societies also typically tend to be more 
democratic than other scientific institutions, allowing individual members a say in the 
debate and development of moral standards. Finally, societies ought to have a vested 
interest in teaching ethics to their members, as fraud reflects poorly on the subspecialty 
that they represent, not only because of the fraud itself, but also because of the inability 
of the community to discover the fraud. Funding agencies also have a vested interest in 
educating their grant recipients: fraud is a waste of their resources that could have been 
better used elsewhere. Both funding agencies and scientific societies can be more  
involved in enhancing the ethical education of science researchers, potentially through 
creating websites that inform researchers,173 and by providing public forums and 
conferences for discussion and debate. Funding agencies should require those who 
receive funding to have ongoing ethical training – potentially even certification, or some 
form of continuing ethical education requirement, not just the typical one course 
prerequisite. 
Journals should also be involved in developing standards;174 they too look bad 
when fraud is discovered in their issues because it reflects poorly on their ability to 
screen and weed out bad papers. Still, they should be careful to not stray too far from 
standards accepted by science in general.175 Given their relative autonomy and their 
                                                                                                                                                 
Id. at 8, 11 (citations omitted); see also Kreutzberg, supra note 22, at 331 (referring to the 
cosi fan tutti effect of seeing how peers and mentors deal with ethical situations). 
170 Frankel, supra note 11, at 216 (noting that there are a number of societies that distribute 
information regarding science misconduct). see, e.g., Am. Soc‘y of Microbiology (ASM), Code 
of Ethics (2000), available at http://www.asm.org/general.asp?bid=14777.  
171 Frankel, supra note 11, at 217. 
172 Journals are also often associated with a specific society, giving the society more leverage 
to teach and possibly enforce ethical norms and behavior.  
173 E.g., Nat‘l Inst. of Health, Bioethics Resources on the Web, 
http://www.nih.gov/sigs/bioethics/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2009). 
174 See, e.g., Vancouver Guidelines, supra note 110; see also Garcia, supra note 135, at 731 
(―More than a half [of the guidelines are] devoted to ethical principles related to the process of 
evaluating and publishing manuscripts in biomedical journals and the relationships between 
editors, authors, peer reviewers, advertisers, and the media.‖). 
175 See, e.g., Garcia supra note 135, at 731 (finding that journals may create unnecessary and 
marginalized ethical requirements). ―In a survey of 66 researchers from a university medical 
faculty in Britain—half of them with more than 30 published papers—only five respondents were 
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absolute control over what gets published, editors may go too far in establishing the 





 In the Letters section of the June 20, 2008 issue of Science Magazine,176 the 
authors describe a Hippocratic-style oath taken by graduating life science doctoral 
students at the University of Toronto. Unlike others who support oaths requiring budding 
scientists to refrain from research that could potentially ever harm humanity177 – 
notwithstanding the fact that scientists are not trained to make such a distinction, nor 
should they be – the University of Toronto‘s oath focuses on the immediate and the 
relevant; scientific misconduct. Although admirable, the oath remains mere window 
dressing without proper follow up. As graduate students go out into the world and 
continue to experience the demands and burdens of a career, this oath might soon become 
a distant memory. 
 Perhaps the next step following the institution of an oath is a continuing 
educational requirement akin to the attorney‘s CLE or the physician‘s CME. But unlike 
many other professions that take oaths, life science researchers are not licensed by any 
particular agency, and lack the requisite continuing education requirements that are 
integral to licensure. 
 Consequently, instead of a bar or a board enforcing continuing education, 
scientific journals could require continuing educational credit as a requisite for 
publishing. Without a specified number of class hours of, for example, ethics, relevant 
regulations, or writing classes, a scientist would be unable to publish her work. While the 
immediate result might be a haphazard Balkanized system of varied requirements for 
different journals, the market would quickly sort out the number and types of courses 
required, creating a relatively universal and manageable requirement-set across all 
journals. 
 Although non-trivial to implement, a system of continuing education that focuses 
on many of the often overlooked components of a graduate education, particularly issues 
of scientific misconduct, would not only help to prevent future instances of misconduct, 
but might also reinvigorate the stagnant US science budget by reassuring an already 
skeptical public that federally funded research is not, as the media might suggest, awash 






                                                                                                                                                 
able to quote all three criteria of the ICMJE for authorship, and only one knew that all three 
criteria were required to credit authorship.‖ Id. 
176 Karen Davis et al., A Graduate Student Oath, 320 Sci. 1587, 1587-88 (2008).  
177 Rotblat, supra note 5, at 1475. 




 ―The problems arise when there is no authority or the authority doesn't see it as its 
task to investigate.‖178 
 
 
1. Due Process 
 
 Given that a scientist‘s career is typically at stake when he is  accused of 
misconduct and fraud, it is imperative that any investigation be impartial and thorough. 179 
Accusations of fraud are exacerbated by the fact that the researcher in question is not the 
only person who stands to lose in a misconduct investigation. The greater community of 
scientists can all be negatively affected by a single infamous case of scientific fraud. 
Although there should not be any particular set of rigid due process guidelines for 
scientific misconduct inquiries,180 there are a number of procedural aspects that should be 
universally upheld in such an inquiry whether it is a civil, criminal, or internal 
investigation.181 
 Thus even if scientists disagree about the extent of a problem and its solutions, all 
should be in agreement that whatever the problem is, it ought to be fixed quickly to 
minimize the negative impact on science.182 Similarly, it is important that the process 
towards guilt or exoneration be free of overburdening complications, for all parties 
involved, so that potential chilling effects related to the process are limited, and that all 
decisions be accompanied by written reasons.183 
 Independent of the enforcing institution or mechanism, it is important, first and 
foremost, that exceptional care be taken to make sure that there is due process given to 
                                                 
178 Jane Smith & Fiona Godlee, Investigating Allegations of Scientific Misconduct, 331 Brit. 
Med. J. 245, 245 (2005). 
179 And fast: ―justice deferred is justice denied.‖ Donald Kennedy, In Science Fraud Case, 
Justice Is Denied, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1996, at A14 (commenting on the New York Times‘ poor 
coverage of the David Baltimore case).  
180 Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975) (―[T]he very nature of due process negates any 
concept of inflexible procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation.‖).  
181 Unfortunately, currently ―there is good reason to believe that most personnel within the 
scientific misconduct bureaucracy—lawyers included—have little sensitivity to possible Fourth 
Amendment—or other constitutional—restraints on scientific misconduct processes.‖ Roy G. 
Spece, Jr. & John J. Marchalonis, Fourth Amendment Restrictions on Scientific Misconduct 
Proceedings at Public Universities, 11 Health Matrix 571, 572 (2001). 
182 Note also that a fast inquiry is an important component of a thorough purging of the 
offending work from the scientific literature. As long as the inquiry is quick, it remains on the 
radar of the editors of the relevant journals. A slow and plodding process, on the other hand, 
threatens to become irrelevant, particularly if the affected journals get new editors who are 
unaware of the investigation. See, e.g., Unger & Couzin, supra note 114, at 39-40. 
183 Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 618 (1985). 
Vol. X The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review  2009 
 
 100 
the suspected scientist, i.e., fair proceedings. 184 Although the Fourth Circuit has affirmed 
that ―to the extent that a government agency is performing an investigative as opposed to 
adjudicative function, it is not affecting legal rights and an individual is not entitled to the 
protections usually associated with the judicial process,‖185 arguably due process ought to 
still apply in many investigations of scientific misconduct, particularly given the potential 
for career-destroying outcomes. Procedural due process imposes constraints on 
governmental decisions which deprive individuals of ―liberty‖ or ―property‖ interests 
within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment. 186 
Here, governmental actors would include not only federal funding agencies and officials 
at state schools, but potentially even private institutions. 187 
 Enforcement could require some form of punishment. Depending on the nature of 
the fraudulent act, the intentions and method of the perpetrator, and the nature of the 
effect on either actual victims, or on the general reputation of scientists, one could 
imagine a range of punishments from a simple reprimand, or restrictions on rewards and 
grants, to grant termination, public ―disbarment,‖ or even civil fines and imprisonment.188 
 The government or an independent group could even set up a Megan‘s Law type 
website that would geographically track all of those who were found to have conducted 
some sort of fraudulent activity. With this sort of public shami ng that ties the researcher 
to a geographic location or even a particular institution, universities and research 
institutions, both public and private, may be unwilling to hire someone who has 








                                                 
184 ―I will admit with you, sir, the absence of any sense of what due process should be when 
some suspicion is aroused. We have never adopted standardized procedures of any kind to deal 
with these isolated events. We have no courts, not sets of courts, no understandings among 
ourselves as to how any one such incident shall be treated.‖ Dr. Philip Handler, President of the 
Nat‘l Acad. of Sci., Testimony before the Congressional Subcomm. on Investigations on 
Oversight, (Mar. 31-Apr. 1, 1981) in David J. Miller, Research Fraud in the Behavioral and 
Biomedical Sciences 77 (David J. Miller & Michel Hersen eds., 1992). 
185 Popovic v. United States, 997 F. Supp. 672, 678 (D. Md. 1998), aff‟d, 175 F.3d 1015 (4th 
Cir. 1999).  
186 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). 
187 Spece & Marchalonis, supra note 181, at 574. 
188 Editorial, PhD — Club Or History, 429 Nature 789, 789 (2004) (commenting on the 
University of Konstanz‘s withdrawal of Jan Hendrik Schon‘s Ph.D. after he was found to have 
been fabricating data). 





 ―[T]he right to self-regulation is not sacred. . . . It must be earned by showing the 
public that we are ensuring that research is being carried out in full honesty.‖ 189 
 There is a pervasive fear in science that attempted regulation by an outside source 
will have a deleterious effect on research and general morale.190 Vannevar Bush 
expressed this in his seminal work, Science The Endless Frontier, the guidebook for 
much of the government‘s involvement in science research for the past half century. 191 
Science researchers have always operated under their own amorphous honor code. 
Buttressed by professional responsibility and a general reverence for science, science 
misconduct, when apparent, was treated rather harshly and internally. A scientist‘s career 
was essentially destroyed when her trustworthiness and reliability were called into 
question. While ill defined, the ethics regarding fraud were clear enough to the relevant 
internal community: data fabrication and falsification are not good for anyone in science, 
given the significant reliance on trust among peers. Even still, there were no formal 
methods for dealing with fraud.192 
 This provincial system did have some limitations: internationally, in addition to 
the language and legal barriers, the lack of formal methods is exacerbated by the lack of 
common, universally agreed upon definitions or standards, the inability for local bodies 
to thoroughly investigate other institutions without personal relationships or some form 
of agreement, and cultural differences that may blur the lines between corruption and 
community standards. 
 While not without faults, self-policing may still be the best option. It is important 
for scientists to be the ones to judge their peers, especially to prevent the widening of the 
already expansive gulf of mistrust between science and the law. Thus, while historically 
somewhat ineffective, self-policing can still be re-jiggered to work better. 
                                                 
189 Abbott, supra note 40, at 13 (quoting Bruno Zimmermann, Head of Research Affairs at the 
Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft, Germany's main grants agency); see also Frankel, supra note 
11, at 216 (noting that the professional autonomy customarily granted to science is a privilege 
granted by society that could easily be taken away). 
190 See, e.g., literature cited supra note 18. 
191  
The publicly and privately supported colleges, universities, and research 
institutes are the centers of basic research. They are the wellsprings of knowledge 
and understanding. As long as they are vigorous and healthy and their scientists 
are free to pursue the truth wherever it may lead, there will be a flow of new 
scientific knowledge to those who can apply it to practical problems in 
Government, in industry, or elsewhere. The history of medical science teaches 
clearly the supreme importance of affording the prepared mind complete freedom 
for the exercise of initiative. 
Vannevar Bush, Science The Endless Frontier 12 (1945).  
192 See, e.g., Baltimore, supra note 3, at 290. 
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 One of the main strengths and weaknesses of the self-policing mechanism has 
been the peer review system. Peer review has weakened in its effectiveness over time, 
mostly because it is viewed as a burden, particularly by more senior scientists, rather than 
an integral component of the scientific enterprise. Older researchers often hand off the 
responsibility to younger and inexperienced graduate students to peer review in their 
name. The anonymity of the system allows these senior scientists to have their reviews 
ghostwritten, protecting them from the embarrassment of a poor or ineffectual review 
written without regard for the importance of the institution. Alternatives to the present 
system, including co-opting methods used in e-commerce sites such as Amazon to 
promote voluntary reviews by non-anonymous peers,193 might be a helpful step in 
reviving the status, importance, and effectiveness of peer review. 
 The two most prominent actors in self-policing academic scientists are the 




 Outside of this blatant conflict of interest between publicly punishing misconduct 
and the need to maintain a scholarly reputation, one pervasive practical problem with 
institutions policing themselves is that, given the rarity of science misconduct tribunals in 
academia, the scientists involved in judging their peers will most likely be novices at 
doing so and potentially biased or even unwilling to believe that fraud has occurred, as it 
goes against their basic understanding of science and the Mertonian idealized institution 
of science.194 
 Even with these aforementioned issues, it is important, nevertheless, that the 
primary investigation occur at the institutional level, as only here, away from the public 
eye, can the accused be protected from what could destroy her career even if she is 
exonerated. While in-house investigations are a potentially enormous burden for the 
institution and all those involved,195 the alternative is a public disclosure that neither the 
accused, nor the institution really wants. One possible solution is to create a semi-
permanent panel,196 one with well-respected academics in each institution to act as 
                                                 
193 Dov Greenbaum, Joanna Lim, & Mark Gerstein, supra note 2, at  296-97. 
194 See, e.g., Kreutzberg, supra note 22, at 330. 
195 ―The toll it takes is enormous. . . . People get wrapped up in these cases for years. They 
have told me they couldn't afford to do it again; it destroys their careers.‖ Abbott, supra note 40, 
at 14 (quoting William R. Brinkley, a dean at Baylor College of Medicine in Houston, Texas, and 
president of the Federation of American Societies of Experimental Biology (FASEB) 
commenting on an inquiry that took place in his institution) . See also generally Unger & Couzin, 
supra note 114. 
196 Using semi-retired academics might be an advantage here, because investigations are time 
consuming. 
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judges,197 and potentially even punish the accused. Such a panel should be encouraged to 
have an extensive, but relatively quick review of the issues, even preceding any full-scale 
investigation with an informal analysis as to whether the case merits further investigation. 
An appellate process could be either internal, through the courts, or some sort of binding 
arbitration. 
 Alternatively, regional panels, filled primarily with semi-retired or emeriti 
scientists, and akin to U.S. federal circuit courts, could be set up to judge and police a 
number of geographically linked schools; these panels would be more likely to be 




 With publications being the currency of a scientist‘s career, one would think that 
journals would be a prime gatekeeper for fraudulent activity. 198 A journal could police 
simply and easily by a limited investigation into the fraud, followed by a retraction of the 
fraudulent papers.199 With the possibility for the journal to simply retract the suspected 
work without publicly accusing the scientist of fraud, coupled with the ability for that 
scientist to appeal the decision, journals could avoid many of the concerns that 
necessitate an expansive due process system.200 
 Scientists may engage in all types of fraud for whatever reason, but independent 
of the impetus for fraud, they are often comforted by the fact that they will most likely 
never be caught, and even if they are caught, they face few if any repercussions for most 
forms of fraud. Thus, it is important for journals to get involved in enforcing some sort of 
punishment as well, although following the proposed tiered system: when fabricated and 
falsified data results in a publication, that publication must be fully retracted. 201 The 
                                                 
197 Some might argue that even within academia, different disciplines need to be judged 
differently. See, e.g., Alison Abbott, Social Scientists Call for Abolition of Dishonesty Committee,  
421 Nature 681, 681 (2003) (―[M]any social scientists think that his book should not be judged by 
criteria used to assess dishonesty in the natural and medical sciences.‖).  
198 See, e.g., Unger & Couzin, supra note 114, at 43 (quoting Harry Klee, the editor of The 
Plant Journal, as stating that a journal should be the ―primary point of enforcement‖ against 
fraud, and  noting that this view is not widely shared by other editors); see also Ljiljana 
Vuckovic-Dekic, Role of Journals in Addressing Scientific Misconduct, 45 Croat. Med. J. 104, 
104 (2004).  
199 This would seem to be the limit of their ability to police. See, e.g., Emma Marris, Should 
Journals Police Scientific Fraud?, 439 Nature 520, 520 (2006). 
200 See, e.g., infra notes 294-313 and associated text.  
201 Alison Abbott & Johanna Schwarz, Dubious Data Remain in Print Two Years after 
Misconduct Inquiry, 418 Nature 113, 113 (2002).  
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journal should also retract plagiarized papers. Importantly, even lower-tiered fraud that 
does not affect the veracity of the paper ought to be acknowledged somehow on the 
electronic record of that publication. The notation doesn‘t have to be permanent and can 
be removed after a set number of years. Such a notation, a blight on any curriculum vitae, 
can serve as a strong deterrent against fraudulent activity. Journals should publish 
regularly on cases of fraud, or run articles related to fraud – so that the ideas are 
constantly in the mind of the researcher. A recent report in Nature noted that, ―[e]ven 
papers that investigators have found fraudulent can linger in the scientific record for 
years.‖202 Journals have to determine the optimal method for notifying scientists of 
retracted papers, possibly even sending information about the retraction to other authors 
who cite the retracted paper. Journals, by making it easier to publish contrary findings or 
findings that show negative results, can help bring questionable and fraudulent papers to 
light. 203 
 Surprisingly, though, a recent survey of the Committee on Publication Ethics 
(COPE) noted that of those journals surveyed, nearly two-thirds have no policy for 
dealing with research misconduct.204 Journals can provide numerous possible 
rationalizations for these lapses, including the typical: fraud in research is rare and can be 
dealt with on a case-by-case basis.205 Or, that the journals are afraid of potential lawsuits 
                                                                                                                                                 
Scientific leaders and misconduct investigators around the world have long 
complained that, even when scientific misconduct is proven, no reliable 
mechanisms exist to remove bad information from the literature. . . .  
 . . . . 
―Somebody must be responsible for informing the journals if papers have 
been found to contain wrong data . . . . And the journals must find ways to alert 
the community.‖  
Id. (quoting Gerhard Neuweiler, former president of Germany‘s science council).  
202 Unger & Couzin, supra note 114, at 40-41 (noting that fraudulent papers that remain in the 
literature continue to get cited, but suggesting that a cost benefit analysis would find that it may 
not be worth dealing with significantly older papers).  
203 Thomas DeCoursey, It‟s Difficult to Publish Contradictory Findings, 439 Nature 784, 784 
(2006). 
204 Journals Winging It on Good Conduct, 311 Sci. 1687, 1687 (2006). The journals surveyed 
were weak on a number of fronts.  
205 See David Goodstein, Scientific Misconduct, Academe, Jan.- Feb. 2002, at 28, 28-29.  
 
Serious misconduct, such as faking data, is rare. When it does occur, it is 
almost always in the biomedical sciences . . . . Science is self-correcting, in the 
sense that a falsehood . . . will eventually be discovered and rejected. . . . Still, 
active measures to protect science are needed, because if the record became 
badly contaminated by fraudulent results, it would no longer be self-correcting. 
Id.; see also Chubin, supra note 43, at 177 (―Scientific institutions tend to treat each detected 
misdeed as an isolated incident with no general implications . . . .‖); Michael Hagmann, Scientific 
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for defamation or breach of contract if they police research fraud. 206 Notwithstanding 
these justifications, journals are failing in their gate-keeping functions, and are potentially 
allowing bad data into the science commons.207 
 Unfortunately, and contrary to conventional wisdom, journals tend not to be good 
gatekeepers.208 Given the lack of infrastructure and resources of most journals, they are 
not good candidates for preventing fraud in research. Journals tend to have ―patchy 
staffing and funding,‖ which makes looking for fraud ―an astronomically expensive and 
difficult thing.‖ 209 
 The present state of authorship further confounds a journal‘s ability to police 
fraud. With large multi-authored papers, it is difficult to discern who is responsible for 
the actual fraud. And, given the multidisciplinary nature of much collaboration these 
days, where papers are cobbled together from multiple distinct disciplines, it would seem 
inequitable to hold all authors responsible, particularly when they probably have nothing 
to do with the actual fraudulent science. To hold every author on a paper responsible for 
fraud would have a significant, chilling effect on collaborations, particularly cross-
disciplinary and long distance collaborations, where it is difficult for every author to 
confirm that everything was done above board. 
 Additionally, journals—in the classical sense of reputable bound periodicals—are 
slowly losing whatever gatekeeper capabilities they once had. Increasingly scientists are 
choosing to publish in a number of alternative venues, including210 online journal 
                                                                                                                                                 
Misconduct: Europe Stresses Prevention Rather Than Cure, 286 Sci. 2258 (1999) (―A lot of 
[U.K. researchers] thought that this only happens in other countries.‖) (quoting the former editor 
of the British Medical Journal); Daniel Koshland, Fraud in Science, 235 Sci. 141, 141 (1987) 
(stating that 99.9999 percent of the research presented in journals is accurate and truthful); Eliot  
Marshall, How Prevalent Is Fraud? That's a Million-Dollar Question, 290 Sci. 5497, 5498 (2000) 
(―There is a ‗troubling discrepancy between public statements about how ‗rare‘ misconduct in 
research supposedly is and the more private belief on the part of many researchers that it is fairly 
common.‖) (quoting Nicholas Steneck); Cherry Murray & Saswato Das, The Price of Scientific 
Freedom, 2 Nature Materials 204, 204 (2003) (noting that there has only been one instance of 
fraud in the seventy-seven years of Bell Labs‘ existence).. 
206 See, e.g., Unger & Couzin, supra note 114, at 42. 
207 See, e.g., Fiona Godlee, Dealing with Editorial Misconduct, 329 Brit. Med. J. 1301, 1302 
(2004) (noting that ―[e]ditors have no mandate, and usually inadequate resources, to  investigate 
[cases of fraud] themselves‖ and, as such, calling for the development of a code of ethics for 
journal editors); see also Smith & Godlee, supra note 178, at 245 (noting that editors do not have 
the ability to thoroughly investigate fraud and leave that responsibility primarily to the 
institutions). 
208 See, e.g., Unger & Couzin, supra note 114, at 38. 
209 Marris, supra note 199, at 521. 
210 See, e.g., Greenbaum, supra note 2, at 293. 
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archives,211 their own online databases,212 and other gray area publishing.213 As selective 
and professionally edited journals continue to lose their monopoly of control over 
scientific publishing,214 they also lose their limited ability to continue to act as a major 
checkpoint into the science information commons. Even if a journal was to retract a 
fraudulent paper, the author could publish it herself, or elsewhere,215 with little, if any, 
bias against her. It then falls to the indexing services, primarily Medline, 216 Pubmed,  217 
and ISI‘s Web of Science,218 to be somewhat responsible and to annotate or remove those 
articles in their databases which are known to be fraudulent or have been retracted.  
Notwithstanding these harsh realities for the publishing world, many journals are 
nevertheless working toward technologies that increase their ability to expose fraud 
within their publications, including plagiarism219 and image manipulation.220 The ability 
of journals to more easily and conclusively ferret out fraud is expected to grow as 
technology develops.221 Nonetheless, ―[u]ltimately, if a journal does uncover evidence of 
                                                 
211 See most prominently arXiv.org, developed by Paul Ginsparg primarily for physics.  Also, 
Harold Varmus, Director of the U.S. National Institutes of Health, attempted to create a central 
depository for both articles and data. And clinmed.netprints.org is ―an electronic archive where 
authors can post their research into clinical medicine and health before, during, or after peer 
review by other agencies.‖ Tony Delamothe et al, Netprints: The Next Phase in the Evolution of 
Biomedical Publishing, 319 Brit. Med. J. 1515, 1515 (1999).  
212See, e.g., Mark Gerstein & Jochen Junker, Blurring the Boundaries between Scientific 
„Papers‟ and Biological Databases, in Nature Y.B. of Sci. & Tech. 210, 210-12 (Declan Butler 
ed., 2002).   
213 Ana Maria Ramalho Correia & Migeul de Castro Neto, The Role of Eprint Archives in the 
Access to, and Dissemination of, Scientific Grey Literature: LIZA - A Case Study by the National 
Library of Portugal, 28 J. of Info. Sci. 231, 231 (2002).   
214 See, e.g., Greenbaum, supra note 2, at 293.  
215 This is possible because journals are not very good at retracting papers, or at publicizing 
the retraction. See Unger & Couzin, supra note 114, at 38. 
216 United States National Library of Medicine, http://www.nlm.nih.gov/ (last visited Jan. 28, 
2009). 
217 PubMed, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/sites/entrez (last visited Jan. 29, 2009). 
218 ISI Web of Knowledge, http://apps.isiknowledge.com/ (last visited Jan. 28, 2009).  
219 Jim Giles, supra note 121, at 258.  
220 See, e.g., Pearson, supra note 136, at 520. 
221 Marris, supra note 199, at 520-21. 
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fraud, it has to rely on the researchers‘ institution or funding agency to investigate fully,‖ 
given the lack of resources at the journal.222 
 Unfortunately it would appear that, given the rash of fraudulent activities within 
the science community, self-enforcement no longer works, at least to act as a deterrent to 
prevent fraud and misconduct. It is not entirely clear why this is the case.223 
 
 
3. Funding Agencies 
 
Once upon a time, a failure to screen out fabricated research was a 
problem only for other scientists . . . . However, . . . when scientists must 
account for public funding of research [the public will] demand stringent 
screening for falsified data that absorb dollars . . . from outside of science 
to remedy real or perceived inadequacies in the internal policing of 
science.224 
 
 Presently funding agencies, such as the National Institutes of Health, take some 
responsibility for the teaching of research ethics within the research community through 
ethical education requirements in their training grants and providing some general 
guidance on issues such as conflicts of interest, authorship, and policies for data sharing 
and handling of human and animal test subjects.225 Funding agencies also are involved 
somewhat in policing their grantees, meting out a range of punishments for misconduct in 
science.226 However, funding agencies typically act on information provided to them by 
                                                 
222 Id. at 521. 
223 See Stankovic, supra note 95, at 1008-09. But see Walter &  Richards, supra note 57, at 
142 (arguing that self-governance ―creates a flourishing environment for desperados eager to 
profit from their misconduct and for zealots--idealists or opportunists, depending on your point of 
view--to don their white hats, join with government and enact Draconian measures‖ – a set of 
circumstances that ―usually catches more naive innocents than street-smart desperados‖).  
224 Burk, supra note 165, at 319.  
225 Sally Rockey, Deputy Dir. Office of Extramural Res., Nat‘l Inst. of Health, Integrating 
Integrity into the Research Process through Training, Presentation at the ESF-ORI First World 
Conference on Research Integrity: Fostering Responsible Research (Sept. 16-19, 2007). 
226 Nat‘l Inst. of Health, U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Hum. Servs., Publ‘n No. 99-8, NIH Grants 
Policy Statement II-16 (1998) , available at 
http://grants.nih.gov/grants/policy/nihgps/nih_gps.pdf. 
 
A finding of misconduct in science may result in a range of possible sanctions 
by NIH, including, but not limited to, withdrawal of approval of the PI or other 
key personnel, debarment, disallowance of costs associated with the invalid or 
unreliable research, withholding of all or part of a continuation award, and/or 
suspension or termination, in whole or in part, of the current award.  
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the principle investigations conducted by the home institutions, rarely conducting their 
own investigations. 
 Many funding agencies may also be too large to effectively police their grantees. 
The National Institutes of Health, in addition to their 6,000-plus intramural scientists, has 




4. Government Enforcement 
 
 While including the federal government and the courts may be necessary to 
effectively police science, it is disliked by many within the science community, 228 given 
concerns that government actions and investigations may be based on inaccurate or 




 The government‘s direct involvement in scientific misconduct officially and 
publicly began with Senator Al Gore‘s subcommittee hearings in 1981.230 The intrusion 
into the internal affairs of the science community was, and continues to be, unappreciated 
                                                                                                                                                 
Id.  
227 NIH – Overview, available at http://www.nih.gov/about/NIHoverview.html  (last visited 
February 1, 2009).   
228 See, e.g., Baltimore supra note 3, at 290 (noting that ―the cost of discovering fraud is 
clearly more than the price tag of the fraudulent work, never mind that the process of discovery is 
erosive of trust and disruptive of the effective course of science‖). Professor Baltimore brings a 
First Amendment argument against the intrusion of the government in the policing of fraud. He 
notes that science is an ongoing debate that is protected by the Freedom of Speech; and like any 
marketplace of ideas, truth will emerge if the debate is allowed to proceed according to its 
inherent market forces; any hindrance to these forces will interrupt and impede the debate. 
Baltimore extends this concept to scientific experiments as well: experiments, integral to the 
scientific process, are a core component of the general scientific discussion.. Then, he notes that 
the government ought not have a place in any policing of science: ―A bedrock principle of First 
Amendment law is that speech, whether verbal or in the form of symbolic conduct, cannot be 
suppressed either because society finds its content offensive or disagreeable or because it fears its 
potential misuse.‖ Id. at 296 (quoting Natasha Lisman, Freedom of Scientific Research: A 
Frontier Issue in First Amendment Law, Boston B. J., Nov.-Dec. 1991, at 4, 6-7).  
229 Id. at 291 (―The criteria that laypeople, especially politicians, might apply to science are 
likely to be wrongly focused because they will be evaluating science by myths rather than 
realities.‖). 
230 Marcel C. LaFollette, The Politics of Research Misconduct: Congressional Oversight, 
Universities, and Science, 65 J. of Higher Educ. 261, 271-72 (1994).  
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by the scientific community.231 ―There is absolutely no good reason why a Congressional 
subcommittee should be doing a job that scientists can and should do themselves.‖ 232 
Moreover, congressional hearings and actions against scientific fraud are seen by many 
scientists as a foray into something that the representatives know little, if anything, about. 
Al Gore‘s congressional hearings were widely perceived, derogatorily, as ―an ambitious 
Congressman using his power to decide what is true or false in science.‖233 
 After years of congressional interest in fraud and misconduct in research, the 
Office of Scientific Integrity,234 later renamed the Office of Research Integrity (ORI),  235 
was established as an effort to remove the responsibility of misconduct oversight from 
the auspices of the funding agencies.236 In addition to ORI, the government continued to 
act to prevent and deal with science fraud through the Commission on Research 
                                                 
231 See, e.g., Baltimore, supra note 3, at 284 (―For the last six years I have personally been 
involved in a controversy that would have been a minor event were it not for the involvement of 
the political world.‖).  
232 Dingell, supra note 76, at A14. 
233 Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home, Tale of a Bully, N.Y. Times, June 24, 1996, at A1. 
234 Ironically it is named along the same lines as Orwell‘s government ministries in his novel 
1984. Gina Kolata, Inquiry Lacking Due Process, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1996, at C3.  
235 The Office of Research Integrity‘s website states that:  
 
[ORI] promotes integrity in biomedical and behavioral research supported by 
the U.S. Public Health Service (PHS) . . . [and] monitors institutional 
investigations of research misconduct and facilitates the responsible conduct of 
research (RCR) through educational, preventive, and regulatory activities. [ORI 
is involved in] developing policies, procedures and regulations related to the 
detection, investigation, and prevention of research misconduct and the 
responsible conduct of research; reviewing and monitoring research misconduct 
investigations . . . recommending research misconduct findings and 
administrative actions to the Assistant Secretary for Health for decision, subject 
to appeal implementing activities and programs to teach the responsible conduct 
of research, promote research integrity, prevent research misconduct, and 
improve the handling of allegations of research misconduct; providing technical 
assistance to institutions that respond to allegations of research misconduct . . . 
conducting policy analyses, . . . administering programs for whistleblowers.  
Welcome to the Office of Research Integrity, http://ori.dhhs.gov/ (last visited Oct. 31, 2008).  
236 This transfer of power was finalized by President Clinton‘s signing of the NIH 
Revitalization Act of 1993. About ORI – History, http://ori.dhhs.gov/about/history.shtml (last 
visited Oct. 31, 2008). 
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Integrity,237 which among other recommendations, called for the creation of educational 
programs dealing with issues relating to the responsible conduct of research.238 
 ORI has been attacked and maligned since its inception. According to the Office 
of Management and Budget, ORI exceeded its mandate (as defined in section 493 of the 
Public Health Services Act) by dealing with science fraud and science misconduct. 239 
ORI is also frequently overruled by the Departmental Appeals Board—indicating serious 
concerns with ORI‘s methods.240 
 ORI lost much of its limited respect among scientists early on it its history. 241 
After its performance in the David Baltimore scandal, it was widely perceived that ORI 
either ―framed an innocent person, or simply failed to argue its case effectively, [but] 
there is no doubt that it turned in an awful performance.‖ 242 
 ORI was a failure partially because it lacked due process: there were no formal 
notices of hearing requirements, no explanations for their charges of misconduct; nor did 
it provide defendants with a summary of their rights, a list of witnesses, or the right to 
cross examine.243 In 1999, ORI was stripped of its policing aspects and was reassigned to 
teach universities how to prevent misconduct and fraud in scientific research.244 
 ORI has attempted to regain its standing within the scientific community through 
significant revisions to its policies.245 While not yet tested thoroughly, there is at least an 




                                                 
237 Id. 
238 Id. 
239 See Daniel Goldberg, Research Fraud: A Sui Generis Problem Demands a Sui Generis 
Solution (Plus a Little Due Process), 20 T. M. Cooley L. Rev. 47, 61 (2003) (noting that there are 
obvious dangers in equipping a new agency with powers over a new and ill-defined violation: 
science misconduct).  
240 Id. at 63.  
241 Id. at 58 (arguing that ORI, through its actions, has shown that it is ―deeply flawed both in 
process and result‖).  
242 Lewis, supra note 233, at A1.  
243 See Sovacool, supra note 12 W1 (―In short, almost all of the elements of due process are 
missing in ORI investigations.‖ (quoting Elizabeth Howard)).  
244 Jocelyn Kaiser, Shalala Takes Watchdog Office out of the Hunt, 286 Sci. 883, 883 (1999).  
245 See Public Health Service Policies on Research Misconduct, 70 Fed. Reg. 28,369, 28,369-
28,400 (May 17, 2005) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pts. 50, 93). 
246 See, e.g., Donald Kennedy, Praise, for a Change, 304 Sci. 1077, 1077 (2004).  
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b. Civil Actions 
 
 Civil actions can be brought against researchers who commit a broad range of 
science-related misconduct and fraud under the False Claims Act (FCA). 247 The FCA, 
however, may be too broad to adequately deal with scientific misconduct, 248 and often 
the amount in controversy would not be worth the government‘s efforts to pursue. 249 
Under the FCA, there is a wide range of potential plaintiffs that can bring suit, 250 
including government employees who learn of misconduct through their duties.251 The 
only real limitations on plaintiffs, or ―relators,‖ in the language of the Act, are that they 
be an original source of the information, even if they were part of the fraudulent activity 
themselves. Because a potential relator is in competition with everyone else for the 
opportunity to act as the plaintiff, a lab worker with information may be unwilling to 
share that information with university administrators, who could deal with the issue more 
effectively and internally, as administrators themselves could become a plaintiff in the 
case, taking away the whistleblower‘s monetary gains granted under the Act.  
 In the last quarter century, Congress has further increased the incentives252 to 
become a plaintiff in FCA cases.253 Congress has also authorized courts to increase the 
                                                 
247 False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006). The act was originally passed in 1863 to 
punish unscrupulous Union Army suppliers and is still used primarily in the world of defense 
contracts. Franklin Hoke, A Novel Application of Federal Law to Scientific Fraud Worries 
Universities and Reinvigorates Whistleblowers, Scientist, Sept. 4, 1995, at 4. 
248 See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 239, at 53 (―This renders the FCA an extremely blunt 
instrument with which to remedy research fraud.‖). There are additional concerns that under the 
new HHS regulations published May 17, 2005, which require institutions to investigate 
allegations of research misconduct and report these results to ORI, which may follow up with 
FCA actions, it may become easier for FCA suits to be brought. See, e.g., Memorandum from 
ReedSmith to Health Care Clients, Research Misconduct: A New Area of Focus for Government 
Enforcement, available at http://www.reedsmith.com/_db/_documents/hc0506.pdf (May 27, 
2005). 
249 See Goldberg, supra note 239, at 57-58. 
250 Often the government does not want to actually go to trial and uses the threat of large 
damages to force defendants to settle. See id. 
251 Burk, supra note 165, at 324-25. 
252 There are currently no HHS regulations that deal with bad faith allegations of science 
misconduct.  
253 See Hoke, supra note 247, at 5. The FCA brings with it a risk of significant financial 
repercussion for universities hosting scientists involved in misconduct with the whistleblowers 
receiving substantial percentages. There have been cases where whistleblowers have received 
hundreds of thousands of dollars. Id. 
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damages awarded, allowing for treble damages. 254 Under the qui tam or ―bounty hunter‖ 
provisions of the Act, a plaintiff can receive no less than 15% and up to 30% of the 
damages award or settlement.255 Reasonable lawyers‘ fees are also recoverable. The 
award structure may, perversely, incentivize whistleblowers to let the meter run on 
fraudulent activity, so as to rack up more damages, even in the face of large social costs 
resulting from the misconduct. Scientists generally are against misconduct being 
policed under the FCA, particularly due to significant concerns that the FCA will be 
abused or misused.256 Under the FCA, things that may not be classified within the 
scientific community as misconduct may still be the basis for a lawsuit. For example, 
communal norms in science would dictate that one look the other way when grant 
applicants include work that has already been done in their applications. While this sort 
of ‗leapfrogging‘ is typical behavior within the community, it may be found, under the 
FCA, to be a false statement.257 
 Moreover, many claims of fraudulent activity in science are not simple, black or 
white cases, and often this uncertainty can be attributed to poor record keeping. Under the 
FCA even poor record keeping or regulatory violations,258 themselves not fraudulent 
science, could be actionable violations. The FCA‘s low bar of proof further aggravates  
these concerns: only a preponderance of the evidence is required. This is in contrast to 
most other instances of civil fraud, where the clear, unequivocal, and convincing 
evidence standard has been imposed.259 
 There are additional fears that as cases become more publicized, every disgruntled 
lab employee will come forward as a relator. The chilling effect resulting from the 
possibility that anyone and everyone in a lab is a potential plaintiff will harm the basic 
level of collegiality and trust that assists in scientific innovation. With even minor 
mistakes having the potential to be a large windfall for a relator, there will be significant 
efforts in time and money to make sure that no one in the lab has the opportunity to 
become disgruntled. The incorporation of the FCA will also result in wasted 
                                                 
254 See False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006).  
255 Hoke, supra note 247, at 4-5. The university of Alabama and one other institution recently 
paid over three million dollars in FCA related penalties. Id. 
256 Keith D. Barber et al., Prolific Plaintiffs or Rabid Relators? Recent Developments in False 
Claims Act Litigation, 1 Ind. Health L. Rev. 131, 135 (2004) (―Recent developments in the use of 
the FCA reveal that it may be fertile ground for abuse by private whistleblowers and the 
government.‖). 
257 Burk, supra note 165, at 326. 
258 See, e.g., Luckey v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 2 F. Supp. 2d 1034, 1046-47 (N.D. Ill. 1998).  
259 See Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 n.18 (1966) (citing 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2498 (3d 
ed. 1940)). 
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administrative resources, both in the lab and within the institution as a whole,260 to make 
sure that the books are perfect and unimpeachable. 
 Costs associated with an FCA action are huge, particularly given the relatively 
low level of misconduct that can trigger an FCA suit. 261 Moreover, in addition to the 
preventative costs, there could be massive costs in document review and other legal fees 
that researchers and academic institutions would have to shoulder. 
 In terms of social costs, a researcher‘s career could be ruined if the cases move 
too quickly without adequate peer review, even if the misconduct was only clerical.262 
Additionally, the whistle-blowing function of the FCA undermines scientific integrity by 
shifting an internally motivated scientific duty, to make sure that scientific knowledge is 
factually correct and without error, to an ―externally motivated pecuniary opportunity.‖ 263 
 Fortunately, scientists probably do not have to be too worried about the 
government bringing FCA cases against them. The FCA is primarily designed to be 
remedial - to remedy the loss to the public  - and not a punitive measure against fraud. 264 
When the government‘s losses to scientific fraud are minimal, as if often the case, FCA 
actions would seem arbitrary and unnecessary, and as such, would be avoided.265 The 
government would have little to gain financially, even with damages trebled.266 
                                                 
260 Vicarious liability is a significant risk for the institutions, even if the institution is unaware. 
See Grand Union Co. v. United States, 696 F.2d 888, 891 (11th Cir. 1983). Institutions should 
also be concerned about counterclaims by laid off employees who have been accused through the 
FCA of misconduct. See, e.g., Angelides v. Baylor Coll. of Med., 117 F.3d 833, 835 (5th Cir. 
1997); Rex Dalton, Neuroscientist Accused of Misconduct Turns on His Accusers, 392 Nature 
424, 424 (1998).  
261 Costs to the plaintiff have actually decreased. See Todd B. Castleton, Comment, 
Compounding Fraud: The Costs of Acquiring Relator Information Under the False Claims Act 
and the 1993 Amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 327, 327 
(1996) (―[T]he1993 Rules Amendments [revising rules 11 and 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure] increase the incentives for relators to bring a qui tam suit by decreasing the cost of 
filing qui tam suits.‖). 
262 See Stankovic, supra note 95, at 1001.. But see Goldberg, supra note 239, at 47-53 (amount 
of recovery may dwarf the actual fiscal costs to society).  
263 Dan L. Burk, False Claims Act Can Hamper Science with 'Bounty Hunter' Lawsuits, 
Scientist, Sept. 4, 1995, at 12.  
264 Goldberg, supra note 239, at 51-52 (―[T]he legal maxim of cessante ratione legis, cessat et 
ipsa lex is relevant—when the rationale for the law ends, the law ends.‖)  
265 Id. at 52-53. 
266 Id. at 57-58. 
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 Thus, although civil FCA sanctions may be appropriate in the context of defense 
contracting,267 it would seem that they are not easily applied to misconduct in science. 268 
 
c. Criminal Sanctions 
 
 As opposed to civil law that is ideally, but often is not, 269 inherently 
compensatory, criminal law is punitive in its nature. But, given the historical outcomes of 
civil actions against suspected fraudulent scientists, and the lack of any restitution to the 
state or the public, one could arguably suggest that all scientific misconduct cases are 
inherently punitive and ought not to be judged under the civil system.  
 Here, the concern with punitive civil actions is that they expose the defendant to 
similar consequences as a criminal trial, but without the concomitant constitutional 
procedures: ―As civil law becomes more punitive, serious doubt arises about whether 
conventional civil procedure is suited for an unconventional civil law.‖270 With this in 
mind, it may be more helpful for the scientist accused of scientific misconduct to be 
accused in a criminal, rather than a civil, setting. The possible outcomes are essential ly 
the same, but the criminal setting provides greater benefits to the accused. Despite those 
who suggest that ―the criminal law would be invoked only when necessary to maintain a 
public threat of severe punishment for those who cause the most harm in the most 
blameworthy circumstances,‖271 past instances of judging scientific misconduct would 
suggest that scientists would be more likely to see a fair result in a criminal court.  
 Civil sanctions should be limited to instances where the regulated behavior has 
some degree of positive social utility, but should, nevertheless, be allowed to internalize 
negative externalities by means of large damages. 272 Criminal penalties, however, are 
necessary for conduct which has no social utility and where society wants to deprive the 
                                                 
267 The FCA was originally developed to respond to fraud in defense contracting. Hoke, supra 
note 247, at 5. 
268 Stankovic, supra note 95, at 1009. 
269See, e.g., United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435, 449-50 (1989) (stating that the government 
sought overly and overtly punitive sanctions during civil action). Note also that more 
administrative agencies are looking towards criminalizing the willful violation of their rules. See 
John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing 
Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 193, 216 (1991) (―Since the mid-
1980s, American law has experienced a little noticed explosion in the use of public welfare 
offenses. By one estimate, there are over 300,000 federal regulations that may be enforced 
criminally.‖).  
270 Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground Between Criminal and Civil 
Law, 101 Yale L.J. 1795, 1798 (1992).  
271 Id. at 1861. 
272 John C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law Models -- 
and What Can Be Done about It, 101 Yale L.J. 1875, 1876, 1882-83 (1992). 
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accused of any gains derived from his actions, as would be the case with most but not all 
instances of scientific misconduct.273 
 Criminal sanctions may not always fit the needs and requirements of the scientific 
community. Civil penalties are optimal in instances where society wants primarily to 
force defendants to internalize the social costs of their actions, here the costs to the 
scientific community, with a focus on the harm caused by the fraud, and less on imputing 
blame, particularly for the lesser tiers of science fraud.274 Further, civil penalties are best 
imposed in situations where society wants to reduce, but not eradicate, the offending 
actions. By contrast, criminal penalties strive to deter all criminalized actions. But, as 
stated earlier, there are instances where fraudulent actions might be helpful for science.275 
Civil sanctions are ―preferable when society wishes to reduce the level of an 
activity, but does not feel able to define the precise standard of behavior it wants.‖ 276 
Criminal sanctions are better suited for instances where society can ―precisely articulate 
the desired standard of conduct.‖277 Given the difficulty in articulating a clear line 
between beneficial and harmful fraudulent actions, civil sanctions may thus be more 
appropriate. 
 Of further practical concern is the fact that criminal penalties are typically 
legislative in origin. These sorts of rules tend to be more dated and less adaptable to 
changes on the ground. Civil penalties, on the other hand, are more flexible in their 
applicability and capable of changing given varied circumstances, although this ability to 
quickly change does create difficulties in providing fair notice. 278 Still, the Supreme 
Court has ―expressed greater tolerance of [vague] enactments with civil rather than 
criminal penalties because the consequences of imprecision are qualitatively less 
severe.‖279 
 Without a clear idea of what the boundaries of current science misconduct are, 
scientists will always be concerned that they could be held liable for some sort of 
unknown or newly determined fraudulent action. Such fear could produce a significant 
chilling effect, particularly on cutting edge research. This concern is mitigated by 
institutions retaining the practical ability to direct the outcomes of investi gations, 
notwithstanding the Office of Research Integrity‘s efforts to standardize how such 
                                                 
273 Id. at 1876. 
274 Id. at 1878. 
275 See supra text accompanying notes 90-92. 
276 Coffee, supra note 272, at 1886. 
277 Id. 
278 Id. at 1881 n.23 (―[T]he principle of fair notice was chiefly intended to permit ordinary 
citizens to be able to arrange their affairs so as to avoid entanglement with the criminal law (or 
presumably with other forms of extreme penalties).‖).  
279 Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99 (1982). 
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investigations are conducted. 280 Professor Coffee notes that if society were to criminalize 
deviations from a norm of ethical behavior within a professional group, the logical result 
would be for the groups to self-insure against criminal penalties by lowering their ethical 
standards.281 
 Criminalizing scientific misconduct would also result in the higher administrative 
costs associated with criminal trials and involve lay juries that might not be the optimal 
peers to effectively judge misconduct.  
 The ideal, then, would be some hybrid form of civil and criminal penalties for 
scientific misconduct, taking the flexibility and informality of a civil action, but merging 
it with the procedural safeguards of a criminal trial. Unfortunately, Professor Coffee 
believes that the Supreme Court is unlikely to take the country in general, or the scientific 
community in particular, in such a direction.282 Ironically, given the extreme social and 
professional costs to all the scientists involved in suspected misconduct, the best route 
would be to forgo civil actions and embrace the procedural controls of a criminal trial, 
albeit while incorporating as many positive aspects of the civil system as possible. 
 Criminal actions can and have been brought for applied and clinical research 
activities. These indictments can be justified, and the scientific context should not 
obscure the fact that criminal activity has occurred, activity that could corrupt the grant 
award process, or that could be mistakenly relied upon for future research or government 
decision making.283 
 ―[C]riminalization [of science misconduct] could benefit scientists and the public 
by strengthening support for scientific research and increasing confidence in the products 
of the research industry.‖284 Criminal sanctions might be appropriate in some instances 
where the costs to society from fraud are very large. Such costs would include, for 
instance, the chilling of some areas of research tainted by prior instances of fraud, 285 
human harm or death resulting from a treatment that is based on fraudulent research, and 
the additional burden on researchers who have to sift through both legitimate and 
illegitimate research.286 While there is no law that punishes science misconduct per se, 
                                                 
280 Office of Res. Integrity, U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Hum. Servs., Sample Policy and 
Procedures for Responding to Allegations of Research Misconduct (2007)  available at 
http://ori.dhhs.gov/policies/documents/SamplePolicyandProcedures-5-07.pdf.  
281 Coffee, supra note 272, at 1879. 
282 Id. at 1891. 
283 Stankovic, supra note 95, at 1004. 
284 Sovacool, supra note 12 (noting that criminalization reduced the severity and frequency of 
misconduct, e.g. the FBI has found that since the criminalization of hate crimes, hate crimes have 
fallen drastically). 
285 Susan M. Kuzma, Criminal Liability for Misconduct in Scientific Research, 25 U. Mich. 
J.L. Reform 357, 408-09 (1992). 
286 Id.  at 392-94. 
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there are many tangential federal criminal sanctions that can be applied to those who 
commit fraud in science, including mail fraud, wire fraud, the federal conspiracy statute, 
and other statutes that punish false statements and false claims.287 Even given all these 
criminal options, until recently, there were few, if any, scientists that had gone to prison 
for scientific fraud.288 
 Mail fraud, which makes it criminal to obtain ―money or property by means of 
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises,‖289 encompasses even half-truths and 
attempts to conceal material facts with the intent to defraud. 290 Thus, false reporting 
(mailing) of facts can be considered mail fraud. Mail fraud, unlike many of the other 
potential criminal sanctions that can be applied against scientists, is not exclusive to 
research funded by government agencies.291 
 There are reasons, however, to not use many of the current criminal sanctions for 
science fraud. The False Statement statute encompasses even statements that were not 
made specifically to the government. ―[It] does not require that the false statement must 
actually have been submitted to a department or agency of the United States, but rather 
that it was contemplated that the statement was to be utilized in a matter which was 
within the jurisdiction of such department or agency.‖ 292 This particular legislative act 
should not be applicable to scientific research because defrauding the government (a 
requirement for culpability) should be determined based on the general morality of 
society, not on a morality specific to science. 
                                                 
287 Stankovic, supra note 95, at 977-79; see also Press Release, Office of Res. Integrity, U.S. 
Dept. of Health & Hum. Servs., Dr. Eric T. Poehlman (Mar. 17, 2005), 
http://ori.dhhs.gov/misconduct/cases/press_release_poehlman.shtml  (listing claims against Dr. 
Eric T. Poehlman, a former tenured research professor at the University of Vermont (UVM) 
College of Medicine in Burlington, Vermont). 
288 Jeneen Interlandi, An Unwelcome Discovery, N.Y. Times Mag., Oct. 22, 2006, at 98, 100. 
289 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006).  
290 Christopher Q. Cutler, McNally Revisited: The "Misrepresentation Branch" of the Mail 
Fraud Statute a Decade Later, 13 BYU J. Pub. L. 77, 82 n.32 (1998). 
291 While mail fraud requires the prosecutor to prove the specific intent of the scientist to 
defraud the victim, this burden can be ―established by circumstantial evidence and by inferences 
from the facts and circumstances surrounding the scheme.‖ Jessica Shannon Schepler, 
Prosecuting Child Support Frauds: A Novel Application of the Federal Mail Fraud Statute to the 
Willful Avoidance of Child Support, 51 Baylor L. Rev. 581, 588 (1999). Additionally, intent does 
not hinge on a showing of personal benefit and can be established by proving tha t the defendant 
intended to ―cause actual or potential loss to victims of fraud, whether to enrich himself, another, 
or no one.‖ Id. 
292 United States v. Candella, 487 F.2d 1223, 1227 (2d Cir. 1973). 
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 Additionally, it may be more difficult to prosecute a university professor who 
may not stand to gain anything monetarily from her research. A jury might find tha t ―a 
person of this group who engages in research misconduct is simply not a criminal.‖293 
 
d. Novel Criminal Sanctions 
 
 Ms. Kuzma, a Deputy Pardon Attorney for the United States Department of 
Justice, argues that the deterrence and condemnation values of a criminal penalty far 
outweigh the unpleasantness of criminalizing research fraud. 294 But with the inherent 
problems relating to the usage of the off-the-shelf criminal code in prosecuting scientific 
fraud, some have suggested that a criminal code be specifically designed for those who 
commit science fraud.295 Under a criminal code, the accused scientist has guaranteed 
rights including, due process, the right to an attorney, the right to confront the accuser 
and the witnesses, and the presumption of innocence attached to a high burden of proof. 
 Ms. Kuzma, among others, suggests that a criminal statute aimed specifically at 
scientific fraud can be designed with the methodology of science in mind. Such a law 
would include a recantation defense, and would require a relatively high level of mens 
rea, thus potentially limiting any aforementioned chilling effects.296 
 Those in favor of criminalizing research fraud note that with the present size and 
scope of biomedical research in the United States,297 it would be nearly impossible for the 
national scientific community to police itself or to enforce its norms. The scientific 
establishment does not have the resources to go after every individual case of fraud, and 
would eventually allow many instances of misconduct to go overlooked, or be lost, 
within the huge research system. It is too hard for the honest scientist to keep track of all 
the dishonest ones; the science community would likely benefit from looking elsewhere 
for help in policing and enforcing its ethos. 
 With this backdrop in mind, a criminal code could be formulated to hold scientists 
liable for offenses that compromise the public‘s trust or the integrity of science. It might 
include offenses that are regularly ignored in the present regime. Actions such as 
misrepresentation of results, cooking data, failing to report negative results, and failing to 
report conflicts of interest, while small and typically negligible on an individual basis, 
have an aggregate effect of undermining the scientific enterprise. The law could be multi-
tiered, having both misdemeanor and felony provisions, depending on the level of fraud 
and the cost of that fraud to society. 
                                                 
293 See Stankovic, supra note 95, at 1003. 
294 Kuzma, supra note 292, at 357. 
295 Id. at 414. 
296 Id. at 415-18. 
297 See, e.g., Shamoo & Dunigan, supra note 20, at 205 (suggesting that there are around 1 
million scientists in the United States with an additional 1.5 million people employed as support 
staff). 
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 It is unclear whether such a law should be vague or highly accurate. On the one 
hand, as mentioned earlier, vague laws tend to promote a chilling of research given the 
fear of unpredictable reprisals.298 ―Words which are vague and fluid . . . may be as much 
of a trap for the innocent as the ancient laws of Caligula.‖299 ―A vague law impermissibly 
delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on an ad hoc 
and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory 
applications.‖300 This applies particularly in a context such as this one, where free speech 
may be restricted; ―[b]road prophylactic rules in the area of free expression are suspect. 
Precision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area so closely touching our most 
precious freedoms.‖301 
 On the other hand, laws are often made intentionally vague in order to 
accommodate the changing and broadening reality that is necessary in the fast paced 
world of scientific research: it is nearly ―impossible to predict and list all the unethical 
actions that might warrant agency action.‖302 ―Conduct such as tampering with other 
scientists‘ experiments, serious exploitation of subordinates, misuse of confidential 
information obtained during the grant proposal review process, or misrepresentation of 
authorship, could, if sufficiently serious, [eventually] be considered misconduct in 
science. Yet, such actions do not fit within the specified categories in the [current] 
definition.‖303 
 The critical need for due process, a key reason for aspiring to a criminal code for 
scientific misconduct, may negate the use of vague statues: ―vague statutes offend Due 
Process by failing to provide explicit standards for those who enforce them, thus allowing 
discriminatory and arbitrary enforcement.‖304 The U.S. Supreme Court ―has long 
recognized that the constitutionality of a vague statutory standard is closely related to 
whether that standard incorporates a requirement of mens rea.‖305 Laws that assess 
criminal liability for scientific misconduct must be understood by the scientists that they 
apply to, because the intent of the defendant is a key part of the analysis. 
                                                 
298 See Nisan Steinberg, Regulation of Science Misconduct in Federally Funded Research, 10 
S Cal Interdis. L J. 39, 104 (2000). 
299 United States v. Cardiff, 344 U.S. 174, 176 (1952). 
300 Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498 (1982). 
301 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963). 
302 James J. Dooley & Helen M. Kerch, PNNL 102044, Research Misconduct and the Physical 
Sciences 5 (1998) (Report prepared for the U.S. Dep‘t of Energy).  
303 Horace Freeland Judson, The Difficult Interface: Relations between the Science and the 
Law, 50 Advances in Genetics 483, 498 (2003). 
304 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 775 (1974). 
305 Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 395 (1979). 
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 But vagueness and due process – two potentially important components of a 
scientific misconduct criminal code – may be able to coexist. For example, in Parker v. 
Levy,306 the defendant argued that both Articles 133 and Articles 143 of the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice describing offenses for instances ―unbecoming an officer and a 
gentleman,‖ and ―to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the armed forces,‖ 307 
were ―void for vagueness‖ under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendme nt. 
Similar to the situation with scientific misconduct, the problem of vagueness in the 
Parker case was exacerbated by the degree to which the law could impinge on First 
Amendment speech rights. The Parker court noted that these – vagueness and First 
Amendment – were valid concerns. Citing Smith v. Goguen,308 the court reiterated that 
the void for vagueness doctrine ―incorporates notions of fair notice or warning, 
[requiring] legislatures to set reasonably clear guidelines for law enforcement officials 
and triers of fact in order to prevent ‗arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.‖‖309 The 
Supreme Court also noted that it has ―repeatedly recognized that the dangers inherent in 
vague statutes are magnified where laws touch upon First Amendment freedoms. . . . In 
such areas, more precise statutory specificity is required, lest cautious citizens steer clear 
of protected conduct in order to be certain of not violating the law.‖310 But the court 
nevertheless curbed these concerns, finding that ―the strong presumptive  validity that 
attaches to an Act of Congress has led this Court to hold many times that statutes are not 
automatically invalidated as vague simply because difficulty is found in determining 
whether certain marginal offenses fall within their language‖ and that ―[v]oid for 
vagueness simply means that criminal responsibility should not attach where one could 
not reasonably understand that his contemplated conduct is proscribed.‖311 In science, 
just as in the military, this outcome (that individuals would not understand what conduct 
is statutorily proscribed) is unlikely, particularly with efforts to educate both communities 
on their codes of ethics. 
 While the Court spends some time differentiating the Military Code of Justice 
from the civilian code in defending its ruling, one could see how the scientific 
community could be analogized to the military one, supporting the expansion of this 
ruling to the scientific community as well. Just as the military requires that its varied 
regulation apply to a much larger segment of the activities of its tightly knit community, 
so too in science, a code ought to apply to the relatively tightly knit scientific community 
for a broader array of activities and conduct ―that in civilian life is not subject to criminal 
                                                 
306 Parker, 417 U.S. at 752. 
307 See 10 U.S.C. §§ 933, 934 (2006).  
308 Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974). 
309 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 752 (1974) (quoting Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 
(1974)).  
310 Parker, 417 U.S. at 775 (Stewart, J. dissenting). 
311 Id. at 757. 
Vol. X The Columbia Science and Technology Law Review  2009 
 
 121 
penalties.‖312 And like the military, scientists are often told of the ethical rules that will 
apply to their work, instead of relying on a doctrine that everyone ought to know the 
ethical guidelines intuitively.313 
 
i. Evidentiary Standard 
 
 In a case involving fraudulent charities, the Supreme Court recently ruled that the 
government shoulders the burden to prove fraud when there is a possibility that speech 
may be protected.314 Potential scientific fraud, particularly when it involves taxpayer 
funded research, would similarly be defrauding the public. But the current burden of 
proof in scientific misconduct cases is a low civil standard of the preponderance of the 
evidence.315 Installing a criminal code for scientific misconduct would also result in an 
increased burden of proof, a much-needed standard given the career-ending implications 
of being found guilty of scientific misconduct.  
 Constitutionally, the courts may be forced to implement a higher burden of proof 
independent of either a criminal or civil action against a scientist. Under the equal 
protection clause, those similarly situated should not be treated differently unless the 
disparity is justified. An administrative agency reviewing a case of scientific misconduct 
needs to provide a legitimate rational reason, one that is not palpably arbitrary or 
erroneous beyond rational doubt,316 for discriminating between academics who currently 
find themselves up against a preponderance of the evidence standard and other 
professionals who typically need to defend themselves against a much higher clear and 
convincing burden of proof.317 And while some might argue that the clear and convincing 
evidence standard is only necessary when revoking or suspending the license of a 
professional, the court could differentiate between licensed professionals who have 
satisfied extensive educational and training requirements and pass a rigorous state-
                                                 
312 Id. at 749. 
313 Similarly, the legal community, where the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility is 
similarly vague in the requirement that a lawyer ought not engage in any conduct that ―adversely 
reflects on his fitness to practice law,‖ may also be analogized to the military situation.  Model 
Code of Prof‘l Responsibility DR 1-102 (1983).  
314 Ilinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600, 621 n.9 (2003) (―[T]o 
avoid chilling protected speech, the government must bear the burden of proving that the speech 
it seeks to prohibit is unprotected. . . . The government shoulders that burden in a fraud action.‖). 
315 Public Health Service Policies on Research Misconduct, 42 CFR § 93.106 (2008). 
316 See Kenneally v. Med. Bd., 32 Cal. Rptr. 2d 504, 510 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994).  
317 In re Medrano, 956 F.2d 101, 102 (5th Cir. 1992) (noting that the Supreme Court has 
defined the clear and convincing standard  as  proof that ―produces in the mind of the trier of fact 
a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established, evidence so 
clear, direct and weighty and convincing as to enable the fact finder to come to a clear conviction, 
without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts‖); see also Cruzan v. Dir. of Mo. Dep‟t of 
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 285-86 n. 11 (1990). 
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administered examination,‖318 and researchers who are not state licensed. Nonetheless, 
the Supreme Court has noted that in instances where the consequences of the court‘s 
actions would be excessively severe, as in the case of finding misconduct, where the 
reputation and livelihood of the scientist are put at risk, the evidentiary standard should 
be at minimum clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.319 
 
ii. First Amendment Issues 
 
 While at first glance First Amendment protected academic freedom would seem 
to provide cover for even fraudulent research, making it constitutionally difficult to 
construct a scientific misconduct criminal code 320 (―Academic writing explaining . . . 
scientific work . . . is speech of the most protected kind‖ 321), the courts have seen fit to 
constrain even this purportedly322 protected speech.323 Case law seems to limit First 
                                                 
318 See Mann v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 90 Cal. Rptr. 2d 277, 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). 
319 ―[W]e have held that due process places a heightened burden of proof on the State in civil 
proceedings in which the ‗individual interests at stake . . . are both ‗particularly important‘ and 
‗more substantial than mere loss of money.‘‖ Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348, 363 (1996); see 
also Woodby v. INS, 385 U.S. 276, 285 (1966). 
320 Note that while writing about experiments comes under the rubric of the First Amendment, 
it remains debatable whether the same can be said for the actual experiments. See Gary 
Francione, Experimentation and the Marketplace Theory of the First Amendment, 136 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 417, 419 (1987); Dana Irwin, Freedom of Thought: The First Amendment and the Scientific 
Method, 2005 Wis. L. Rev 1479, 1480 (2005); Roy Spece Jr., & Jennifer Weinzierl, First 
Amendment Protection of Experimentation: A Critical Review and Tentative 
Synthesis/Reconstruction of the Literature, 8 S. Cal. Interdis. L. J. 158, 158 (1998). 
321 Steinberg, supra note 298, at 88; see also Baltimore, supra note 3, at 293-297. 
322 See J. Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the First Amendment," 99 
Yale L.J. 251, 252-53 (1989). 
 
The First Amendment protects academic freedom. This simple proposition 
stands explicit or implicit in numerous judicial opinions, often proclaimed in 
fervid rhetoric. Attempts to understand the scope and foundation of a 
constitutional guarantee of academic freedom, however, generally result in 
paradox or confusion. The cases, shorn of panegyrics, are inconclusive, the 
promise of their rhetoric reproached by the ambiguous realities of academic life. 
The problems are fundamental: There has been no adequate analysis of what 
academic freedom the Constitution protects or of why it protects it. Lacking 
definition or guiding principle, the doctrine floats in the law, picking up decisions 
as a hull does barnacles.  
323 Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973) 
(―But we do not conceive academic freedom to be a license for uncontrolled expression at 
variance with established curricular contents and internally destructive of the proper functioning 
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Amendment protection of academic freedom to instances where the academic is 
conducting herself as an academic.324 We could extrapolate from here that where an 
academic is involved in misconduct, her academic freedom based First Amendment 
rights would not attach. 
 Nevertheless, while academics engaged in misconduct would not be protected 
under the rubric of academic freedom, one might argue that their speech would be 
otherwise protected as any other civilian. If so, government actions against scientific 
research need to be very narrowly tailored and the government‘s interest in promoting 
good science has to be compelling enough to suppress First Amendment rights. It could 
be argued that, given science‘s ability to police itself, and to eventually flush out much of 
the fraud that goes on, the government‘s interests are not compelling enough to 
constitutionally create such a law.325 
 To avoid these issues, this paper argues that First Amendment rights should not 
encompass false statements. This assertion, while seemingly obvious, is non-trivial, as 
the courts have not seemed to come to any clear decision on the matter. Typically, the 
courts, in discussing false statements, are referring to slanderous or libelous statements, 326 
which are included in the archetypal list of speech not covered by the First Amendment: 
libelous speech,327 fighting words, 328 incitement to riot,329 obscenity,330 and child 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the institution.‖); see also Stastny v. Bd. of Trustees of Cent. Wash. Univ., 647 P.2d 496, 504 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1071 (1983).  
 
Academic freedom is not a license for activity at variance with job related 
procedures and requirements, nor does it encompass activities which are 
internally destructive to the proper function of the university or disruptive to the 
education process. . . . Academic freedom does not mean freedom from academic 
responsibility to students, colleagues and the orderly administration of the 
university.  
Stastny, 647 P.2d at 504. 
324 ―[S]ociety recognizes that the freedom of scientific inquiry is not an absolute right and 
scientists are expected to conduct their research according to widely held ethical principles.‖ Nat'l 
Bioethics Advisory Comm'n, Cloning Human Beings: Report and Recommendations of the 
National Bioethics Advisory Commission 6 (1997). 
325 See Steinberg, supra note 298, at 104. 
326 E.g., Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 503-05 (1984) (holding 
that the defendant could not be held liable in a suit for public product disparagement, because the 
defendant did not make his false statements about the plaintiff‘s speaker system with ―actual 
malice‖).  
327 See Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952). 
328 See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942). 
329 See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969). 
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pornography.331 Nowhere, however, does this oft-repeated list include pure false 
statements that do not have repercussions for any particular person.  
 The court in Gertz v. Robert Welch332 may have come the closest to limiting First 
Amendment protection for false statements. The court noted that while ―there is no such 
thing as a false idea,‖333 there is also no blanket protection for all false statements of fac t. 
Further, even though there is no such thing as a false idea, false statements couched in 
terms of an opinion or idea are still not protected: ―[e]xpression of opinion not honestly 
entertained is a factual misrepresentation.‖334 
 Still, even the Gertz court acknowledged that there was some protection for false 
statements. Although citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan335 and Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire336 to support that proposition that ―there is no constitutional value in false 
statements of fact [as they] belong to that category of utterances which ‗are no essential 
part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that 
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in 
order and morality,‘‖337 the court nevertheless found that ―[t]he First Amendment 
requires that we protect some falsehood in order to protect speech that matters .‖338 This 
provides a sort of breathing space.339 The Court reaffirmed this position protecting some 
false statements in Herbert v. Lando340 and in Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co.341 
                                                                                                                                                 
330 See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957). 
331 See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982). 
332 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974). 
333 Id. (―However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the 
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas.‖).  
334 United States v. Konstantakakos, 121 F. App‘x. 902, 905 (2d Cir. 2005). 
335 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
336 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
337 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340 (citing Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572). 
338 Id. at 341. 
339 BE&K Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 531 (2002). 
340 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 171-72 (1979). 
341 Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 495 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (―[S]ome 
false and misleading statements are entitled to First Amendment protection in the political 
realm.‖).  
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 Although some courts have read the Supreme Court‘s opinions to limit this 
breathing space to non-commercial speech342 or only those instances where the false 
statement is not knowingly or recklessly made,343 others are unwilling to create any per 
se rule regarding First Amendment protection of false statements. 344 Arguably, scientific 
misconduct and its concomitant false statements could be closely analogized to the 
Court‘s decision to limit First Amendment protection for false commercial statements: 
―[t]he truth of commercial speech . . . may be more easily verifiable by its disseminator 
than . . . news reporting or political commentary, in that ordinarily the advertiser seeks to 
disseminate information about a specific product or service that he himself provides and 
presumably knows more about than anyone else.‖345 Moreover, like commercial speech, 
scientific speech is hardier: ―[s]ince advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, 
there is little likelihood of its being chilled by proper regulation and forgone entirely.‖ 346 
Publishing is the sine qua non of most academic scientists and will probably not be 
chilled enough by the lack of First Amendment protection to be seriously damaged.  
                                                 
342 See Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary 
Counsel of Sup.e Ct. of Oh., 471 U.S. 626, 638 (1985); In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982); 
Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977). 
343 See Hadad v. Croucher, 970 F. Supp. 1227, 1242 (N.D. Ohio 1997) (―The Supreme Court 
in Pickering declined to extend protection to false statements that are knowingly or recklessly 
made.‖); see also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964). 
 
The use of calculated falsehood, however, would put a different cast on the 
constitutional question. Although honest utterance, even if inaccurate, may 
further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the 
lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a 
like immunity. . . . Hence the knowingly false statement and the false statement 
made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.  
Garrison, 379 U.S. at 75; see also Marinello v. Bushby, No. 1:95cv167-D-D, 1996 WL 671410, 
at *10 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 1, 1996) (―It is well established law that, subject to some limitations, 
false statements are not entitled to First Amendment protection. Even in its narrowest application, 
the knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth do 
not enjoy constitutional protection.‖) (citations omitted).  
344 Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1179 (9th Cir. 2004) (―[S]uch statements ‗are not per 
se unprotected by the First Amendment when they substantially relate to matters of public 
concern.‘‖) (quoting Johnson v. Multnomah County, Or., 48 F.3d 420, 424 (1995)), rev'd, 547 
U.S. 410 (2006). 
345 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 27 45 P.3d 243, 252 (2002) (quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. 
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976)); see also 44 Liquormart v. 
Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 499 (1996) (Stevens, J., plurality opinion); Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. 
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 760 (1985) (Powell, J., plurality opinion); Bose Corp. v. 
Consumers Union, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 n.22 (1984). 
346 Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772 n.24. 
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 Further, at least one court has suggested that ―the First Amendment does not 
protect false statements of fact that are part of a course of criminal conduct.‖ 347 Although 
somewhat circular, if would seem than that if scientific misconduct were to be 
criminalized, First Amendment protection would not apply to false statements made by 
those involved in the misconduct. 
 In addition to the First Amendment concern, other constitutional issues include 
the scope of the government‘s ability to collect notebooks and other lab records for use in 
a misconduct investigation. Under most federal grants, the grantor retains the right to all 
the data and ―anything related thereto,‖ which broadly defined could mean any record of 
any result in the lab.348 Under Fourth Amendment search and seizure protections, the 
ability of funding agencies and/or university administrators to go in and collect all of the 
lab‘s documentation may be more constrained than is currently practiced.349 
 
iii. Access to Information on Exonerated Scientists  
 
 A further concern is the public availability of information, through the Freedom 
of Information Act, regarding scientific misconduct in cases where the allegedly 
fraudulent scientist was exonerated. The primary purpose of the Freedom of Information 
Act (―FOIA‖)350, which provides generally for disclosure of agency records and 
information, is to ―open[] administrative processes to the scrutiny of the press and general 
public,‖351and ―to pierce the veil of administrative secrecy and open agency action to the 
light of public scrutiny.‖352 The Act provides a number of exemptions to access to 
information; Exemptions 6 and 7(c) in particular, after a balancing of public and privacy 
interests, may limit availability of information in instances where the disclosure ―could 
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.‖353 
                                                 
347 United States v. Stewart, No. 03 CR 717 (MGC), 2004 WL 113506, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 
26, 2004); see also United States v. Chan, No. 94 CR 150 (PKL), 1995 WL 29460, at *1 
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 26, 1995) (―[T]he First Amendment does not protect consciously false statements 
made in furtherance of a criminal fraud.‖). 
348 Roy G. Spece, Jr. & John J. Marchalonis, supra note 181, at 574. 
349 Id. at 618 (noting that Schowengerdt v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 823 F.2d 1328, 1337-38 (9th 
Cir. 1987) would find a constitutionally relevant government action even in internal private 
university investigations into fraud).  
350 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).  
351 Renegotiation Bd. v. Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 US 1, 17 (1974). 
352 Wis. Project On Nuclear Arms Control v. U.S. Dep‟t of Commerce, 317 F.3d 275, 279 
(D.C. Cir. 2003) (quoting Dep‟t of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976)). 
353 5 U.S.C. § 552 (b)(6), (b)(7)(C) (2006). 
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 Given the potential for damage to a scientist‘s career even in instances of 
exoneration,354 courts should not allow for grants of access to information regarding 
exonerated scientists. Notwithstanding the fact that information ―relating to business 
judgments and relationships‖ does not qualify for an exemption of FOIA, 355 and that, 
arguably, scientists who have applied for publicly funded grants have already surrendered 
their privacy; the position advocated here has strong precedent.356 For example, the D.C. 
Circuit has held that FOIA requests to the Patent and Trademark Office for information 
identifying attorneys, who had been targets of misconduct investigations but against 
whom charges were dismissed, are exempted under Exemption 7(c).357 Whatever form 






If we do not police ourselves, others may step in to do so. The result could 
be a scientific enterprise that is increasingly constrained by legal 
strictures, financial oversight, and bureaucratic provisions. We must 
recognize that good science resembles art more than it resembles the law, 
accounting, or government. If scientific research is beset with paperwork 
and regulation, much of the joy and creativity in doing science could 
disappear . . . imped[ing] scientific progress [and making] our field much 
less attractive to the dedicated and talented young researchers who 
represent the future. 358 
 
 The general population has a growing mistrust of scientists in general, and often 
of their aims, ideologies, and research. In order to regain this trust, there need to be 
stronger ethical controls put in place in the scientific community.  While some have 
suggested that the scientific community should focus on preventing inhumane uses of 
their research, this author feels that misconduct and fraud in science, a more important 
and potentially more relevant issue, must be dealt with first. Communicating directly with 
the public seems to be difficult for most scientists, so it is suggested that the scientific 
                                                 
354 See, e.g., Lurie v. Dep‟t of the Army, 970 F. Supp. 19, 37 (D.D.C. 1997) (―[T]he mere 
mention of an individual‘s name in a law enforcement file will engender comment and 
speculation and carries a stigmatizing connotation.‖ (quoting Fitzgibbon v. C.I.A., 911 F.2d 755, 
767 (D.C. Cir. 1990)). 
355 Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. Dep‟t of Justice, 863 F.2d 96, 100-01 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
356 See McCutchen v. U.S. Dep‟t of Health & Hum. Servs., 30 F.3d 183, 198 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(holding that privacy interests of exonerated scientists greatly outweigh ―negligible‖ public 
interest in disclosure). 
357 See Carter v. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, 830 F.2d 388, 394-95 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
358 Alberts & Shine, supra note 18, at 1661. 
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community use some sort of public display to show that it acknowledges the public‘s 
concerns. A publicly sworn oath might accomplish this. 359 But, while an oath may raise 
some, albeit minimal, awareness within the scientific community, it would probably do 
little to prevent the underlying moral issues that have become a growing concern. 360 
Scientists, like everyone else, respond much better to concrete actions and to reward and 
punishment provisions. 
 While scientists ought to be punished for their misconduct, it is integral that the 
punishment fit the crime to minimize any chilling effects on research. To this end, it is 
important to distinguish scientific fraud from fraudulent activity in other professions: 
science fraud is usually motivated more by social pressures than monetary gains, and as 
such it might seem inappropriate, particularly to the scientists, that science fraud be dealt 
with using the exact same techniques and institutions as clearly money driven forms of 
fraud.  361 
 Prevention ought to include well-designed courses on ethics that will be required 
early and continuously throughout a researcher‘s career. Mentors should be encouraged 
and reminded by their institutions and granting agencies of the importance of creating a 
strong role model.362 Scientific societies and funding agencies must promote talks and 
conferences on issues relating to fraud in science. Additionally, they can perform random 
and arbitrary, but confidential and private, data audits, akin to financial audits, as a 
method to constantly scan the system for fraud, and to act as an extra disincentive to 
commit fraud.363 
Both the type and the method of punishment are important in this regard. Heavy 
civil and criminal penalties seem to be extreme and wasteful in most instances. 364 
                                                 
359 See, e.g., Lila Guterman, A University's New Oath for Scientists: First, Do No Plagiarizing, 
Chron. of Higher Educ. News Blog (June 24, 2008), http://chronicle.com/news/article/4729/a-
universitys-new-oath-for-scientists-first-do-no-plagiarizing (reporting the administration of a new 
Hippocratic Oath, pledging ethical research and scholarship, by the University of Toronto‘s 
Institute of Medical Science).  
360 See, e.g., David Graham, Revisiting Hippocrates: Does an Oath Really Matter?, 284 
JAMA 2841, 2842 (2000) (―[M]any modern oaths have a bland, generalized air of ‗best wishes‘ 
about them, being near-meaningless formalities devoid of any influence on how medicine is truly 
practiced.‖).  
361 Goldberg, supra note 239, at 50. 
362 See, e.g., Frankel, supra note 17, at 219 (―[I]t is probably safe to say that some of the 
reported incidents of scientific misconduct on the part of junior scientists can be attributed in part 
to the breakdown of the mentoring process.‖).  
363 See Shamoo & Dunigan, supra note 20, at 209; see also Adil E. Shamoo, Correspondence, 
Data Audit Would Reduce Unethical Behaviour, 439 Nature 784 (2006). Shamoo and Dunigan 
note that such an audit ought to keep scientific methodologies in mind and should be done by 
peers rather than the government.  
364 It is also important to weigh whatever gains adhere to society by stringently punishing 
researchers against the obvious costs of chilling research. 
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Optimally, after determining a universal definition of fraud that incorporates the 
idiosyncrasies of the scientific community, scientists will consider creating a criminal 
code particular to scientific misconduct and incorporating a tiered system of culpability, 
if for no other reason than pushing misconduct into the criminal realm will afford 
scientists with due process,365 more appropriate levels of proof, and the proper degree of 
deterrence. A slow and drawn-out trial can ruin the careers of both the innocent and 
guilty, not to mention destroy years of productive research for all involved.366 
Science, above all, has to remember Einstein‘s exhortation: ―Many people say 
that it is the intellect which makes a great scientist. They are wrong: it is character.‖367 
                                                 
365 A chief complaint with ORI is the lack of due process. See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 239, 
at 63; Reynolds, supra note 19, at 816-18. 
366 One compelling criticism of the David Baltimore scandal is the losses that were imposed 
on Dr. Baltimore‘s research while he was engulfed in the case.  
367 Albert Einstein. See, e.g., Bruce Alberts, President, Nat'l Acad. of Sci., Harnessing Science 
for a More Rational World, Address at the National Academy of Science‘s 140th Annual 
Meeting, at 7 (Apr. 28, 2003) (transcript available at 
http://www.nasonline.org/site/DocServer/speech2003.pdf).  
